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This eBook provides an overview of the findings and proposals of 
the Horizon 2020 ADEMU research project (June 2015 – May 2018). 
The main aim of the project was to reassess the fiscal and monetary 
framework of the European Economic Monetary Union (EMU) after 
the euro crisis, when this framework is still in transition and under 
debate. The research has used, and has further developed, the tools 
and theories of modern economics and finance, as well as of modern 
legal research, with three aims: 
• to gain a better understanding on how economies, with 
heterogeneous agents, behave and react to policies in times of crisis 
and recession – with a focus on European economies through the 
euro crisis; 
• in light of this enhanced understanding, to reassess the current EMU 
framework and existing proposals for reform – in particular, the 
Presidents’ Reports and European Commission proposals; and 
• to come up with new proposals to strengthen the resilience and 
competitiveness of the EMU which can be implemented with 
consensus in the current heterogeneous euro area. 
The first aim required covering a large number of related topics, 
including sovereign debt crisis, risk-sharing and economic stabilisation 
policies, fiscal stimulus and consolidation policies, fiscal multipliers, 
optimal tax policies in the global and automated economies, financial 
stability, and macroprudential and unconventional monetary policies. 
The second implied focusing on the financial and economic stability 
of the euro area; in particular, the incomplete Banking Union and the 
not yet fully functioning Economic and Fiscal Union. The third aim 
resulted in two new proposals to strengthen the EMU’s risk-sharing and 
economic stabilisation capacity: the European Stability Fund (ESF) and a 
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In the last few years, the persistent aftermath of the euro area crisis has proved to be a 
lasting test for the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). But how member 
states have responded has depended substantially on individual political sentiment. 
The right path forward for the euro area as a whole cannot be forged without a clear 
understanding of the heterogeneities between member states, of the EMU framework, 
and of its role in strengthening the EU.
This eBook is the culmination of the European Commission’s Horizon 2020 ADEMU 
(A Dynamic Economic and Monetary Union) Project, led by the European University 
Institute and encompassing the work of economists from the Barcelona Graduate 
School of Economics, Católica Lisbon School of Business & Economics, CERGE-
EI, Toulouse School of Economics, Universität Bonn, University College London, and 
the University of Cambridge. Through a range of events and research production, the 
ADEMU Project has brought together academics and policymakers from these and 
other institutions to better understand the euro crisis and the role of the monetary union, 
and draws clear policy lessons for member states. 
The authors make two clear proposals as a result. The first is to use a European Stability 
Fund – an expanded European Stability Mechanism – as a constrained mechanism to 
improve risk-sharing across heterogenous member states. The second is a European 
Unemployment Insurance System, to introduce a congruent system of unemployment 
insurance across different euro area labour markets. Both proposals reinforce the role 
of the EU as a partnership of diverse member countries.
CEPR thanks Ramon Marimon and Thomas Cooley for editing this eBook, and Anil 
Shamdasani and Sophie Roughton for its excellent production. CEPR, which takes no 
institutional positions on economic policy matters, is delighted to provide a platform 
for an exchange of views on this topic.
Tessa Ogden
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The 2008 financial crisis took most governments and international institutions and 
agencies by surprise. The European Commission was no exception; in particular, its 
7th Framework research funding programme did not contemplate funding research on 
financial crises or, more generally, economic crises or recessions (Ramon Marimon, 
one of the authors of this Introduction, was then on the Advisory Committee for 
Social Sciences and Humanities of FP7). It was not until the first call of the following 
Framework programme – the Horizon 2020 Programme – in 2014 that such research 
was properly funded, with a specific call for research on “[O]vercoming the Crisis: 
New Ideas, Strategies and Governance Structures for Europe” (H2020-EURO-
SOCIETY-2014). This seemed to be a call that European macro research economists 
could not ignore, since by 2014 research in this area was blooming and, in response 
to the euro crisis, the overall fiscal and monetary framework of the EMU was being 
revamped and further developed.  The ADEMU project, aimed at linking “the supply of 
new ideas” and “the demand for reassessing the fiscal and monetary framework of the 
EMU”, was a successful applicant to that call. 
This VoxEU-ADEMU eBook provides an abridged overview of research that has been 
conducted under the ADEMU project. In this Introduction, we very briefly summarise 
the twelve chapters that follow. As usual, the views expressed in each chapter are those 
of their authors, but they usually reflect ADEMU research conducted by themselves and 
others, as well as discussions in conferences, workshops and other ADEMU activities.
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Lessons from the euro’s first twenty years 
The first chapter, by Giancarlo Corsetti, draws important lessons from the first twenty 
years of the euro while emphasising the problems – i.e. what deserves to be studied and 
what needs to be corrected. He essentially argues that the failure to properly assess risks 
(in other words, risk misperceptions) resulted in misallocations of resources, both in 
the expansion and in the recession (the two flip sides to the euro crisis).  He examines 
four worrisome features: (i) diversity, a positive characteristic of Europe, becoming 
(a negative) polarisation (something to which, he hypothesises, the euro area has 
contributed); (ii) the amplification effects underlying recessions (a topic also discussed 
in Chapters 4 and 5 of the eBook); (iii) the ‘diabolic loop’ linking public and private 
liabilities; and (iv) the risk ‘stressed’ countries ran of experiencing an even more severe 
self-fulfilling crisis (i.e. a crisis driven by pessimistic beliefs about the future of the 
euro area). But Corsetti also recognises the stabilising role played by the ECB, from 
2012 onwards, and by the ESM. Specifically, he reports on his ADEMU research into 
the successful lending practices of the ESM, beyond the standard practices of the IMF. 
As he stresses, this is not simply a happy ending to the story, since the legacies of the 
euro crisis remain (including the excessive accumulated debt and the polarisation) and 
the EMU needs to be more resilient in order to stabilise large recession shocks and, 
more generally, to properly pursue stabilisation policies. These are the issues discussed 
in the remaining chapters of this eBook.
The EMU’s capacity for risk sharing and economic 
stabilisation 
The next two chapters focus on one of the two weakest economic dimensions of 
EMU in 2018: its risk-sharing and economic stabilisation capacity (the other is its 
incomplete Financial Union). Both chapters refer to macro quantitative projects that 
have been developed over the past three years, resulting in the two main ADEMU 
policy-institutional recommendations for EMU. In Chapter 2, based on Ábrahám et 
al. (2018a), Ramon Marimon shows how the currently debated European Stability 
Fund can be designed as a constrained efficient risk-sharing mechanism, not only 
providing risk sharing and stabilisation in normal times, but also acting as an efficient 
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crisis-management mechanism. Had this mechanism already been in place, the euro 
crisis would have been less severe and long lasting, and the mechanism would now 
be an effective financial tool with which to confront the ‘debt overhang’ problem, 
transforming risky non-contingent defaultable debts into riskless constrained contingent 
debt contracts, without mutualising them. 
In Chapter 3, based on Ábrahám et al. (2018b), Árpád Ábrahám, João Brogueira de 
Sousa, Ramon Marimon and Lukas Mayr study another currently debated issue: should 
the EU (or a subset of its countries) develop a common unemployment insurance (UI) 
system, possibly complementary to the national UI schemes? To address this issue, the 
authors develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with search frictions to show how 
differences across European labour markets – for example, the different distributions 
across ‘employment, unemployment and inactivity’ – can be summarised using a few 
parameters determining, for example, job creation and destruction. This provides a 
novel picture of European labour markets which allows the authors to test what the 
possible risk-sharing gains of a common UI scheme are and, more specifically, whether 
European countries – that is, the properly weighted employed, unemployed and inactive 
agents of each country – would agree to a common design for a  European UI system. 
Almost to the authors’ surprise, they find that the answer is yes.
New models for understanding recessions and optimal 
policy responses
The next two chapters have a common theme: the development of new dynamic 
macroeconomic models that can enlighten our understanding – beyond standard classical 
real business cycle and New Keynesian representative agent models – of recessions 
and, therefore, of optimal policy responses. Both relate to the recent macro literature 
(e.g. Huo and Rios-Rull 2018) – and build on ADEMU research that contributes to 
this – which studies economies with heterogeneous agents and frictions, where demand 
and supply effects are intrinsically related and must be accounted for in the design 
of economic policies.  Chapter 4 by Morten Ravn builds on his work with Vincent 
Sterk emphasising the possible – and empirically relevant – increase in endogenous 
earning risk in times of crisis, which may trigger long-lasting recessions or ‘liquidity 
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traps’, even with positive inflation. In this context, more reactive fiscal and monetary 
stabilisation policies are needed than those postulated by New Keynesian models with 
homogenous agents.1
Chapter 5 builds on the recent work of the authors, Paul Beaudry, Dana Galizia and 
Franck Portier, which emphasises the fact that the last US and euro recessions may 
not have been unique in having followed a relatively long expansionary period and 
lasting longer than ‘standard’ real business cycle crises (Beaudry et al. 2016, 2018). 
In their model, the interplay of Keynesian ‘deficient aggregate demand’ and Hayekian 
‘excessive supply of capital’ (e.g. housing) gives rise to (locally) unstable business 
cycles. In this context, stimulating demand is desirable, but a simple Keynesian dictum 
of ‘increasing aggregate demand’ may be counterproductive, given the Hayekian effect.
Resilience through fiscal policy
Part of the economics research that has ‘bloomed’ with the crises has revisited the 
literature on fiscal multipliers, paying special attention to their role during recessions 
and fiscal consolidations (e.g. Pappa et al. 2016). Ferriere and Navarro (2018) show 
that in an economy with heterogeneous agents the effect of government spending 
policies crucially depend on the progressivity of the taxes that finance the expenditure; 
in particular, the more progressive they are, the larger the effect. Similarly, Hagedorn et 
al. (2018) show that in a HANK model the fiscal multiplier can be quite large – larger in 
a ‘liquidity trap’– and very sensitive to whether government expenditures are financed 
by taxes or debt. 
Many stimulus packages experimented with during the euro crisis were based on the 
belief that the right positive multipliers would ‘do the work’, but in fact they did not 
(for example, in the case of Spain’s €11 billion stimulus package in 2008). Chapter 6 by 
Martial Dupaigne and Patrick Fève builds on their work showing why (Dupaigne and 
Fève 2016). They provide a characterisation of multiplier effects and show that to have 
a positive effect on investment and not only on consumption, stimulus packages must 
1 See also Beaudry and Portier (2018).
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be persistent, which makes them predictable for private investors. In other words, the 
Hayekian effect can be offset, and even reverted, if the new investment opportunities 
are stimulated with the package. Unfortunately, in periods of fiscal consolidation there 
is no time for persistent stimulus, and stimulus packages may only amplify excess 
capital (as happened with public construction works in Spain during 2008–2010).
Fiscal policy and, in particular, the design of tax policies and their coordination has 
been another area of ADEMU research. Chapter 7 by Pedro Teles provides an overview 
of this work and shows its scope and relevance for the EMU, from its theoretical 
foundations underlying the role of limited commitment (the focus of work by Patrick 
Kehoe and co-authors and a theme revisited in Chapter 12), to the key, yet neglected, 
topic of optimal taxation policy in the global economy (Chari et al. 2017). This work 
offers an important policy insight: to preserve free trade, value added taxes should be 
used (with border adjustments, if needed), not capital income taxes as is being done 
now in most European countries. Looking ahead, the chapter concentrates on a possible 
new tax that has already been discussed in the European Parliament, namely, a tax on 
automation.
The main part of Chapter 7 is based on Teles’ joint work with João Guerreiro and Sergio 
Rebelo (Guerreiro et al 2018). A first result is that according to optimal taxation theory, 
since robots are an intermediate good they should not be taxed. This may be reinforced 
if the net employment effect is positive.2 However, compensating losers may not be 
easy, even if there is an estimated positive effect  – for example, in European countries 
that are ‘digital front-runners’ (McKinsey&Company 2017) –  and even more so if the 
net effect is not positive (in the EU on average, for example, or in the southern EU in 
particular). Their main result is that when optimal taxation theory takes into account 
that people cannot be taxed differently – say, because they do a routine job – then it may 
be optimal to tax robots, and under plausible conditions it is optimal. Incidentally, based 
2 The McKinsey&Company report concentrates on Europe’s ‘digital front-runners’ and for these countries estimates that 
‘digital technologies’ had a positive balance between job creation and destruction of around 80,000 jobs a year (1999–
2016). It also estimates, for a 2030 horizon, a 1.2% GDP per capita growth increase due to automation.
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on the new developments of optimal taxation theory, Teles also vindicates “progressive 
taxes with a universal transfer” as a way of minimising redistribution costs, another 
controversial issue raised, for example, in the European Parliament.
Financial markets and stability
The next two chapters focus on financial markets. Chapter 8 by Hugo Rodriguez 
Mendizabal focuses on the Banking Union and the role of the ECB in financial markets. 
At the end of the chapter is a figure that is by no means new, but is still disturbing, 
showing as it does how fragmented EU financial markets remain ten years after the 
2008 financial crisis. It reinforces the warnings and recommendations coming out of 
the ADEMU research by economists and law scholars which Rodriguez summarises. 
More specifically, on the design of the European Banking Union, ADEMU work 
emphasises the delicate trade-off between a fully credible design for the Single 
Resolution Mechanism (SRM), which requires a large (private) fund capacity, and 
a bank’s profitability; on the ECB, it emphasises the weak legal basis of its role as 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). Regarding the European Deposit Insurance 
Scheme (EDIS), instead of dwelling on the standard argument that ‘it should be done 
to complete the Banking Union’ (i.e. on a par with other banking unions, such as in the 
US), Rodriguez proposes moving towards narrow banking as a more effective ‘moral 
hazard-free’ path, one of the requirements for which the ECB has already facilitated.3 
The chapter also surveys ADEMU research on the different roles of the ECB: the optimal 
choice of transparency in supervision, and the important role it played in monetary and 
financial stability during the euro crisis (albeit limited by not being able to take risks, as 
the Federal Reserve Board was able to do with its Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan 
Facility, counting as it could on the financial backup of the US Treasury). 
Chapter 9 by Radim Boháček focuses on the role of macroprudential policies in helping 
to achieve financial stability, providing an overall perspective of the literature to which 
ADEMU research has contributed: experimental and theoretical work on macroprudential 
policies targeting excessive leverage; the important role that funding liquidity (i.e. 
3 This recommendation is based on Rodríguez Mendizábal (2017). 
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funding against collateral) has played in euro area financial crises (for example, in 
Ireland); the possible misallocation of resources due to differences in asset liquidity; 
the role of procyclical macroprudential capital controls in alleviating overborrowing; 
the role of international cooperation in designing effective macroprudential policies; 
the weak effect of attempting to reduce mortgage debt with inflation; and the role of 
intermediation costs in explaining observed asset price patterns.
EMU reforms from a legal and political economy perspective
Chapters 10 and 11 provide a ‘legal’ and a ‘political economy’ perspective, respectively, 
to ADEMU research. Chapter 10 by Giorgio Monti provides a critical assessment, from 
a legal perspective, of the different proposals concerning the possible reform of the 
European Stability Mechanism. In particular, it discusses the contrasting ‘German’ 
and ‘French’ political visions and the specific proposal of the European Commission 
(2017). In doing so, it refers to some of the ADEMU research done by its LAW team 
(also reflected in Chapter 8). Neither the ‘German’ vision (transferring the surveillance 
of the Stability and Growth Pact from the European Commission to the ESM and 
extending the ESM mandate) nor the ‘French’ view (transforming the ESM’s current 
‘crisis-resolution mechanism’ function into an IMF-style institution able to provide 
‘preventive funding’) seem to be implementable without a revision of the EU Treaties. 
Therefore, Monti turns to the Commission proposal, which aims to transform the 
ESM into a ‘Union body’.4 Unless new specific functions for the ESM (aside from 
its eventual role as ‘back-stop facility’ for the Single Resolution Mechanism) can be 
found, there does not seem to be much need for anything other than a possible reform 
of the ESM Treaty. 
4 A term used by René Smits in his ADEMU Perspective #No. 8 (ADEMU Newsletter, November 2017), which also 
provides a legal perspective on this and other EMU issues.
The EMU after the Euro Crisis: Lessons and Possibilities
8
Chapter 10 does not discuss the European Stability Fund (ESF) proposal presented in 
Chapter 2,5 but the ‘pragmatic approach’ of reforming the ESM Treaty is consistent 
with the ESF proposal to transform current ESM contracts into ESF contracts (see also 
Chapter 12).
Chapter 11, by David K. Levine and Andrea Mattozzi, does not enter into the often-
discussed political issues of the EMU (for example, in reference to Chapter 10, the 
underlying political trade-off between enhancing the role and capacity of the ESM and 
making the ESM a ‘Union body’, and keeping the supervisory role in the Commission). 
Rather, the authors take a step back not only to focus on deeper EU political economy 
concerns, but also to discuss their work developing the corresponding political economy 
theory. In particular, they focus on three related aspects: rent seeking in the banking 
sector, the potential capture of regulatory institutions by collusive groups (e.g. lobbies), 
and the trade-off between disruptive and collusive behavior in collusive groups. 
Conclusion: The EMU’s fiscal and monetary framework
The concluding Chapter 12, by Ramon Marimon, goes back to the original aim of 
the ADEMU project “to reassess the overall fiscal and monetary framework of the 
EMU”. It takes the Presidents’ Reports (Van Rompuy et al. 2012, Jucker et al. 2015) 
as the benchmark ‘roadmap’ and provides a brief assessment of the three EMU unions 
(Monetary Union, Economic and Fiscal Union, and Financial Union) in 2018, based 
on the experience of recent years and on ADEMU research. Both the EMU experience 
and the theoretical and empirical research of ADEMU and other economists and 
legal scholars consistently emphasise the important role of the EMU institutions – in 
particular, the ECB and the ESM – in the resolution of the euro crisis and the need to 
further strengthen the resilience of the EU to other (in part self-indulged) recessions. 
This translates into making the Economic and Fiscal Union more capable of credibly 
satisfying its role of guaranteeing economic stability and completing the Financial 
Union. This view is compatible with different degrees of European Union integration.
5 A legal assessment underway by the ADEMU-LAW team.
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In fact, the ADEMU project has taken the view that the role of social scientists is 
precisely that of submitting existing policies and proposals to scrutiny and, if possible, 
proposing new ones that may better accomplish stated objectives, such as ‘economic 
growth and stability’. The main institutional proposals of ADEMU – presented in 
Chapters 2 and 3 and further discussed in Chapter 12 – are possible, consistent and 
implementable designs (founded on research), and it is up to others to decide whether, 
or to what degree, to implement them. If they are taken on board, ADEMU research has 
also provided tools to develop the required engineering work.
As said at the beginning of this Introduction, this eBook does not cover all of the 
research that has been conducted under the ADEMU project, and more information 
on this, as well as on ADEMU’s activities in its three years of existence, can be found 
on the project’s website. But in the same way that EMU is not complete, and in a 
sense will never be, many questions raised by the EMU experience and by ADEMU 
research remain open. Unfortunately, the European Commission is not contemplating 
the possibility of providing further funding, but we see PhDs and post-docs producing 
New Ideas and we are confident that ADEMU research will continue.
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1   Lessons from the euro crisis an 
dealing with its debt overhang
Giancarlo Corsetti
Cambridge University and CEPR
Introduction: Country risk in the euro area crisis
Looking back at the first twenty years in the life of the euro, it is apparent that the 
institutions and policies in the euro area have failed to prevent both the gross 
underestimation of (country, private and public) risk during the first decade, and 
the magnification and polarisation of risk along national borders during the second 
decade. While the initial underestimation of risk was not specific to the euro area, risk 
polarisation was arguably a key unique feature of the euro area crisis. Understanding the 
root of this risk polarisation, and which steps can be taken to ensure that the euro area 
is not systematically vulnerable to this kind of crisis, has been a priority of ADEMU. 
To put it simply, a monetary union among independent states cannot be built on the 
illusion that there are no sovereign risk differences. But it cannot be stable and well-
functioning without credible institutions and policies to anchor risk differentials to 
fundamentals, letting country risk systematically magnify shocks and cause divergence 
of borrowing costs of government firms and households across borders.
Country risk polarisation has weighed heavily on the euro area’s recovery from the 
crisis. First, it has reduced the effectiveness of monetary policy. Policy rate cuts 
and other measures by the ECB could not be fully transmitted to (and thus reduce) 
borrowing rates in high-risk countries – rates remained volatile per effect  of country 
risk. This consequence of polarisation has  constantly fed disagreement among member 
state on the appropriate monetary stance at the union level. Second, risk polarisation 
has reduced the scope for fiscal policy. On the one hand, governments in crisis countries 
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faced the need to adopt pro-cyclical austerity measures in the middle of a downturn and 
maintain a contractionary stance throughout the recovery (if any). On the other hand, 
governments in low-risk countries had an incentive to keep the budget relatively tight 
in order to maintain their low-risk status (and with this, very low borrowing costs). As a 
result, the aggregate macroeconomic stance of the euro area has remained insufficient, 
and the area has experience a slow recovery on average, even though some individual 
countries performed quite well by international standards.
For the euro area as a whole, debt is not much higher than for other large industrial 
countries and/or macro regions in the world. However, as a result of risk polarisation, 
the debt distribution in the region is heavily asymmetric. Today, the burden of debt is 
higher where employment and economic activity are still far from satisfactory (or even 
below pre-crisis levels) and fiscal and financial risks are still high.
In the absence of effective corrective measures at both the national and euro area level, 
debt overhang is likely to cause the existing differences to persist for a long time into 
the future. In crisis countries, high sovereign debt and risk foreshadow higher taxes 
and lower provision of public goods. This in turn discourages domestic investment and 
economic activity, exacerbating inequality (e.g. Brinca et al. 2017) and even fostering 
the migration of (skilled) labour (e.g. Bandeira et al. 2017). Debt overhang thus weighs 
heavily on the success of budget correction policies and reforms (Müller et al. 2016).
In this chapter I will first discuss the work of ADEMU on the roots of the country risk 
crisis in the EU, and then delve into three issues relating to strengthening the euro 
area’s ability to address the problem. The first is the need for a monetary backstop, 
largely satisfied by the launch of the Outright Monetary Transactions programme by 
the ECB in 2012. The second is the still largely open question of how to stabilise large 
recessionary shocks, if and when they occur in the future. The third is the rationale 
and scope for relying on an official lending institution to enhance debt sustainability in 
Europe, as a way to support debt deleveraging in the continent.
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Beyond OCA theory: Learning the costs of an incomplete 
monetary union
The traditional theory of optimal currency areas has long called attention to the fact 
that joining a monetary union requires independent countries to give up autonomous 
monetary instruments of stabilisation and a key margin of adjustment, namely, the 
exchange rate. This loss may be more or less costly depending on key conditions 
concerning the scope and effectiveness of fiscal policy, capital market development, 
factor mobility, wage and price flexibility, and the symmetry of business cycle shocks. 
The influence of this theory on the policy debate cannot be emphasised enough (see the 
modern reconsideration by Chari et al. 2016 and Corsetti et al. 2016a). However, it is 
fair to say that this theory falls short of providing effective guidance for understanding 
the depth and nature of the country risk crisis in the euro area.
Especially when the shocks bring the policy rate to its effective (zero) lower bound, large 
adverse shocks may activate amplification mechanisms and perverse spirals. Pioneering 
work by Rendahl (2016), Den Haan et al. (2017) and Ravn and Sterk (2016) stresses 
that, in response to a hike in unemployment, households tend to raise their saving rates 
substantially for precautionary purposes. When unemployment is high, it takes longer 
to find a job, which in turn magnifies income uncertainty for both workers who have 
lost their job and for workers who may fear losing theirs. As a result, aggregate demand 
falls, leading to more unemployment, more income uncertainty, and thus more saving. 
This negative spiral – unemployment, income uncertainty, low demand – has arguably 
affected all industrialised countries during the Great Recession, whereas monetary 
authorities could not reduce policy rates below their effective lower bound, and the 
scope for fiscal policy was constrained by debt accumulation.
In the euro area, things were much worse. The negative spiral from labour income 
uncertainty interacted with another powerful negative spiral rooted in the strict 
interconnection of sovereign, banking and macroeconomic risk at the national level. 
This problem was documented and stressed early on by Corsetti et al. (2013, 2014) 
as well as by the Euronomics group – the latter with a focus on the ‘diabolic loop’ 
linking sovereign risk to credit crunches via the large exposure of national banks to 
domestic debt (e.g. Bocola 2016, Sosa-Padilla 2017). In the euro area crisis countries, 
there is a strong correlation between sovereign risk spreads, banking spreads, and the 
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borrowing costs of households and non-financial firms (possibly well beyond what can 
be explained by inefficiencies due to a high concentration of national public debt in the 
balance sheet of national banks), as documented by Arellano et al. (2017) and Delatte 
et al. (2016), among others.
It is worth restating, if only briefly, the main mechanism at play. In the two-year 
period between 2010 and the summer of 2012, markets started to price sovereign risk 
on expectations that some member states could run into difficulties in sustaining the 
large fiscal costs of their banking crises and/or their large debt or in rolling over their 
maturing liabilities, or in anticipation of a possible break-up of the euro (Kriwoluzki et 
al. 2017). At the time, especially after the statement by Merkel and Sarkozy in Dauville, 
there was virtually no policy framework that could anchor these market expectations.
The moment markets developed arbitrary negative expectations of output growth in a 
country, they anticipated larger deficits and debt accumulation. A weaker fiscal outlook 
immediately translated into a hike of sovereign risk. With risk spilling over to all 
residents in the country (via a deterioration of bank assets and an anticipation of lower 
profits by firms), other things equal, interest rates rose on both government and private 
borrowing, driving down demand already in the short run. Unless policy measures, at 
the national or monetary union-wide level, could effectively counteract these effects, 
pessimistic expectations became self-fulfilling. Countries with high debt and limited 
fiscal space were extremely vulnerable to losses of market confidence.
Lost in translation at the launch of the euro: Monetary 
backstop of government debt
A discussion of the potential destabilising effects from these spirals is missing in 
the traditional optimal currency area (OCA) theory, as is a detailed analysis of what 
instruments a country would give up by delegating monetary policy to a common 
central bank.
The experience of the euro suggests that, for many a reason, an important function of 
central banking became ‘lost in translation’ when monetary policy was transferred from 
national monetary authorities to the ECB at the birth of the euro. In the words of the 
ECB president Mario Draghi:
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“Public debt is in aggregate not higher in the euro area than in the US or Japan... 
[T]he central bank in those countries could act and has acted as a backstop for 
government funding. This is an important reason why markets spared their fiscal 
authorities the loss of confidence that con- strained many euro area governments’ 
market access.” Mario Draghi, Jackson Hole Speech, 22 August 2014 
It took some time (until September 2012), and quite a bit of institutional and political 
development, for the ECB to be able to put the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) 
programme in place, thereby reacquiring the fundamental function of providing 
monetary backstop that had been ‘lost in translation.’ 
Work in ADEMU has explored the theoretical foundations of this key institutional 
development. Belief-driven runs on public debt have long been debated in the literature, 
in formal models at least since Calvo (1988).  An analytical reconsideration of the 
mechanism is offered by Ayres et al. (2016), Bassetto and Galli (2017 ) and Corsetti 
and Dedola (2016). The role of the central bank in shielding a country from belief-
driven runs is the main subject of the latter contribution, who considers the theoretical 
mechanism (and conditions) under which a programme of contingent debt purchases by 
the central bank can eliminate a government’s (welfare) incentive to default. 
An issue specific to monetary union is that individual member countries may not 
internalise the cost of union-wide inflation resulting from their default decision (in the 
extreme case in which balance sheet losses are so large that the ECB has to deviate from 
its target of making good on its liabilities) and/or may play strategically, counting on 
a monetary bailout ex post. To address moral hazard issues, OMTs are only activated 
if the country is in a European Stability Mechanism programme, and thus subject to 
conditionality and in receipt of official lending. 
The problem of stabilising large recessionary shocks
The Outright Monetary Transactions programme launched by the ECB in 2012 has 
arguably eliminated, or at least reduced, the possibility of self-fulfilling creditor runs on 
a euro area member state. Yet, as discussed by Corsetti et al. (2017), the programme falls 
short of creating the conditions necessary for an accommodative fiscal policy stance, 
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especially in response to large negative shocks. The reason is that in order to qualify 
for the OMT, a country’s fiscal policy must be pre-approved by policymakers from the 
other member states; this pre-approval is almost certain to require that the country’s 
fiscal policy be non-accommodative. In practice, national fiscal policies appear to have 
remained effectively non-accommodative after the start of the OMT programme, and 
thus close to the policies that presumably would have been required to obtain approval 
for activating government bond purchases by the ECB under the programme. 
An important step forward in completing monetary union consists of addressing fiscal 
pro-cyclicality. The first lesson from the crisis is that a large recessionary shock cannot 
be dealt with by relying exclusively on monetary policy, but rather accommodative 
monetary and fiscal policy together are required to satisfactorily stabilise the economy. 
A second key lessons from the crisis, specific to the euro area, is that the appropriate 
fiscal stance cannot be achieved without addressing polarisation, as this translates into 
either contractionary, or at best mildly expansionary, budget policies across the union.
How can a monetary union among independent fiscal states achieve an accommodative 
aggregate fiscal stance in response to large recessionary shocks? There is no single 
institutional solution. Possible strategies are discussed in the ECB Working paper listed 
under Corsetti et al. (2016)  and Tabellini (2016).1 An answer is also provided by the 
overarching proposal of a European Stability Fund for the EMU, discussed by Marimon 
in Chapter 2 of this eBook.
Whatever the approach, it is doubtful that the euro area can afford to ignore the need 
to strengthen its stabilisation policy framework against the tail risk of large recessions.
1 Corsetti et al. (2016) build on the following elements: a non-defaultable Eurobond that co-exists with defaultable 
national public debt; fiscal criteria for the member states that allow for fiscal accommodation when required by economic 
conditions, while being consistent with fiscal discipline for each member state; the ability for each country to restructure 
national public debt, as a last resort, in an orderly way without prejudice to full participation in the European Union or 
the euro; and fiscal support for the Eurosystem at the level of the euro area so that balance sheet considerations do not 
interfere with the ECB’s policies. 
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Debt sustainability and debt reduction: The role of official 
lending
Debt overhang and country risk polarisation loom over the future of the EMU, motivating 
calls for ‘risk reduction’ and ‘risk sharing’. A fundamental challenge to completing 
monetary union consists of understanding how to optimally trade off these objectives – 
that is, have countries pursue fast deleveraging while reducing exposure to financial and 
macroeconomic instability (e.g. Tabellini 2017). This trade-off is complex and requires 
a careful reconsideration of both theoretical results and empirical evidence. 
In this respect, ADEMU has engaged in a thorough analysis of recent experiences of 
euro area and international institutions providing loans to crisis countries, through the 
lens of a quantitative model (Corsetti et al. 2017). Official loans affect governments’ 
incentives to issue, repay, or default on debt, hence they impact how much debt a 
country can sustain, just like tax capacity. In other words, official lending regimes 
can raise the amount of debt that is sustainable at any point in time vis-à-vis both 
fundamental and rollover risk. Euro area lending institutions can, in principle, support 
countries in their efforts to reduce outstanding liabilities and address debt overhang, by 
basically shielding these countries (and the union) from the costs inherent in a default. 
A quantitative exercise can shed light on the most efficient ways to achieve this goal, 
and highlight policy trade-offs to be taken into considerations.
By comparing the ESM and the IMF programmes in the euro area, it is apparent that 
the ESM lends more, at much longer maturities and at much lower rates (Gabriele 
et al. 2017). Focusing on Portugal as a case study, Corsetti et al. (2017) develop a 
quantitative model contrasting the effects of long-term and short-term official loans, 
offered at different below-market rates, on a government’s optimal decision to default 
in economies subject to both fundamental (output) and rollover risk. 
Results from the exercise show that official loans can substantially raise debt 
sustainability. In the counterfactuals, Portugal can sustain up to between 80% and 
180% of GDP depending on parameter specifications. Lengthening maturities has a 
stronger impact than reducing official lending rates. 
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However, the analysis also shows that, by making a higher stock of debt ‘safe’, official 
lending affects the average debt level that the government optimally maintains in 
the long run. A higher average debt ends up making the country more vulnerable to 
adverse dynamic developments in (exogenous) fundamentals. In other words, official 
lending causes fundamental default to become more likely. It is worth stressing that 
the trade-off described above exists independently of the effect that lending may have 
on a government’s incentives to exert ‘effort’ or implement ‘costly reforms’ to enhance 
sustainability (these are not modelled in the exercise). 
These results suggest that, while the ESM and IMF have undoubtedly contributed to 
containing potentially disruptive effects from the country risk crisis, their activities 
need to be framed in a more general and consistent strategy of risk reduction and risk 
sharing.
Looking at recent policy proposals, it is not uncommon to treat the euro area›s debt 
problem as two separate problems: first, how to restructure the large stock of legacy 
debt; second, how to create new institutions that will allow improved international risk 
sharing in future. This approach raises deep theoretical issues. Time-inconsistency 
is central to both problems: Brendon (2018), a significant debt write-down may be 
desirable now, but would violate past promises. A credible risk-sharing institutional 
design must be robust to future reassessment. The key question challenging economic 
theory is to how to consider both components simultaneously – that is, how to find a 
normative approach to international risk sharing that will prescribe an appropriate level 
of outstanding debt and its future evolution, given a country›s recent economic and 
fiscal performance. ADEMU provides leading work in this direction, with theoretical 
contributions (e.g. Brendon and Ellison 2017, Kehoe and Pastorino 2016 and Balke and 
Ravn 2016), but especially with the proposal for a European Stability Fund detailed by 
Ábrahám et al. (2018). 
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2 A European Stability Fund for the 
EMU
Ramon Marimon
European University Institute, UPF – Barcelona GSE and CEPR
There are two related issues currently on the EMU agenda: the need to strengthen the 
European Stability Mechanism “as a robust crisis management mechanism” (European 
Commission 2017a), and the need to enhance the EU’s capacity to provide risk sharing 
and fiscal stabilisation (Junker et al. 2015). Building on our ADEMU work “On the 
optimal design of a Financial Stability Fund” (Ábrahám et al. 2018), my co-authors and 
I show that the most efficient design would be to merge both functions into a European 
Stability Fund (ESF), which would effectively transform current risky debt liabilities 
into safe fund contracts, taking the form of long-term state contingent bonds subject 
to endogenous constraints, to avoid undesired redistribution or implicit bailouts and 
moral hazard problems. With this design as a constrained efficient mechanism, the ESF 
should also confront two additional pending issues: the ‘debt overhang’ problem, and 
the development of EU safe assets. Furthermore, the ESF can be implemented with 
minimal changes to the current structure and legal status of the ESM.  In this chapter, I 
briefly summarise these findings.
One recognised problem with the EMU design is how country- or region-specific shocks 
can be smoothed, given that there is a common currency and there are limitations on 
fiscal national policies (the Fiscal Compact). Even under the present, more flexible 
interpretation of the Stability and Growth Pact, the ability to share risks is very limited 
compared with federal systems, where the same federal budget provides some risk 
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sharing to imperfectly correlated shocks across the federation.1 Ferrari and Rogantini 
(2017) have shown, using counterfactual analysis, that being in the euro area has not 
helped to smooth consumption – in particular for countries on the periphery. The 
development of the European Banking Union can help to pool risks, but it is unlikely that 
it will have the smoothing effect that pro-cyclical local tax revenues have in federal tax 
systems.  Similarly, it can be argued that the ESM can help to smooth consumption, but 
it is not designed as a risk-sharing mechanism, rather as a crisis-resolution mechanism. 
As we will see, there are gains to be had from integrating both functions.
A well-designed European Stability Fund must, on the one hand, take into account 
the constraints within which it will operate and, on the other hand, deliver the desired 
outcomes, which should constitute its mandate. In particular, three constraints need to 
be accounted for: 
• First, ex post solidarity in a heterogeneous union is limited (i.e. risk-sharing transfers 
should not become persistent transfers beyond some mutually accepted limits). 
• Second, as with any insurance scheme, there may be moral hazard problems, 
since idiosyncratic shocks (for example, welfare state commitments) can have an 
important endogenous component but, due to limited information or to sovereignty, 
the contract cannot be made ‘conditional on the effort’ that best policies require. 
• Third, a ‘union of sovereign heterogeneous countries’ means that risk profiles and 
policies can be very different. In other words, what is needed is the design of a 
constrained efficient risk-sharing mechanism for heterogeneous participants. 
In our quantitative models, efficiency is measured in welfare gains (more specifically, 
consumption equivalent gains), but it is important to list other tangible desired 
outcomes, and we mention five: i) risk sharing and consumption smoothing; ii) fiscal 
1 Furcieri and Zdziencka (2015) estimate that in the EA15 over the period 1978–2010, 70% of countries’ business cycle 
shocks were not smoothed, while the percentage is substantially lower in US states (25%) and in German Landers (20%). 
Using their methodology, the estimate for the EA19 for 1995–2015 is 83% (M. Lanati, Max Weber postdoctoral Fellow 
of the EUI).
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stabilisation (i.e. fostering countercyclical fiscal policies); iii) a high capacity to absorb 
severe shocks; iv) minimisation of productive and social distortions (often associated 
with fiscal consolidations); v) building up trust across the union.
The proposed European Stability Fund sets a long-term contract with each participating 
country according to its risk profile, specifying state-contingent countercyclical transfers 
designed in such a way that neither the country nor the fund has any incentive to break 
the contract at any point in time (for example, by stopping making their payments), so 
the country exercises the right amount of effort to reduce country risks, and at any point 
in time the present value of the contract for the fund is non-negative (i.e. there is no 
mutualisation of losses for participating countries).
It is interesting to note how the ESF mechanism compares with (de facto defaultable) 
long-term uncontingent sovereign debt contracts currently in place, when the risk-averse 
‘borrowing’ country is subject to similar shocks that the  euro area ‘stressed’ countries 
have been exposed to in the last ten years. As our calibrations and simulations show, 
without debt crises the real euro crisis would not have been so severe – for example, 
there would have not been the severe contraction of consumption that we have observed 
– and therefore the welfare of the borrowing country would have been better, even if ex 
post permanent transfers from the risk-neutral fund had been set to zero. 
ESF risk-sharing transfers take the form of long-term (state-contingent) bonds, and 
the fund has an important capacity to absorb existing (non-contingent) debts; therefore 
it can also be seen as an institution that transforms non-contingent risky debts into 
contingent debts – effectively non-defaultable debts, to the extent that ex post, neither 
the debtor nor the lender wants to breach or renegotiate the contract. In other words, 
without questioning that highly excessive debts may need to be restructured, a fund 
contract has a much greater capacity to absorb existing debts (i.e. to deal with the ‘debt 
overhang’ problem) than a new, possibly very long-term, non-contingent debt contract. 
Furthermore, by its very design, the debt contract is a safe asset in the balance sheet of 
the ESF, which should make ESF debt offerings highly rated in the international market 
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and, if (when) it gains sufficient capacity, the ESF should be able to act as a backstop 
in the EMU, say, to the European Banking Union, or act as a fund of an European 
Unemployment Insurance System (EUIS).2  
Why is all this possible? A simple answer is: because we show it theoretically and 
with a well-calibrated model of the euro area ‘stressed countries’! A deeper answer is: 
because well-designed long-term (ex post) contingent contracts are powerful ‘carrots’ 
for participating countries, in a similar way that access to the ECB and ESM has 
been a key ‘carrot’ in the resolution of the euro crisis. However, the similarities and 
differences between these existing institutions and the proposed ESF are important.  As 
with the ECB, participation of an EU country in the ESF should not be compulsory, 
neither should participation in it be a ‘stigma’; on the contrary, it should be the normal 
stabilisation, crisis-prevention mechanism that EU countries use on a regular basis. 
In contrast with the ECB, and more similar to the ESM, it is a fiscal mechanism, not 
a monetary one (and hence its name). However, there are two important differences 
with the current ESM. First, an ESF contract does not presuppose, or require, a crisis 
situation. Second, the conditionality of an ESF contract is ex post (i.e. performance 
based) and not ex ante (e.g. conditional on agreeing to an austerity/reform programme); 
the former builds up trust, the latter stigma and resentment.
It is always possible? The obvious answer is: no! As with any constrained efficient 
mechanism, there are trade-offs, which can be of two types. The first type is between the 
constraints themselves and efficiency: the more stringent they are, the lower the gains 
of a fund contract, and at a certain point the stringency wipes out the gains altogether. 
For example, participation constraints become more stringent if a borrowing country 
can achieve the above objectives on its own, or if the political risks – say, of exiting 
the union – are high; and similarly, if the acting lender, the ESF, is obliged to be more 
stringent or must satisfy additional (e.g. legal) constraints. 
The second type of trade-off is between simplicity and efficiency, which can take two 
related forms: the ‘conditionality’ of the contract, and ‘how comprehensive’ the fund 
contract is with respect to other government liabilities. A less contingent contract is 
2 See Chapter 3 in this eBook.
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simpler in its design, but this entails a potential loss of efficiency and possibly an ex post, 
costly and complicated execution, as happens with uncontingent defaultable debt. But 
even if the latter cost is not present – say, with a ‘rainy day’ or ‘large economic shock’ 
insurance fund – there is a loss of efficiency in terms of implementing a countercyclical 
fiscal policy and smoothing consumption, since less contingency translates into more 
stringent participation constraints and less sensitive moral hazard constraints.  
Similarly, it is simpler if the fund contract only covers a (small) fraction of a 
government’s liabilities, without accounting for the rest; the ‘rest’ can be covered by 
standard debt contracts, for example. However, as happens with existing proposals for 
a European safe asset, these residual debt contracts may become more risky as these 
debts accumulate, threatening the same stability of the fund contract, unless the ESF 
can commit to a strict mandate of not rescuing countries in this situation. Unfortunately, 
such a strict mandate may not be possible, and a better – although more complex – 
design would be to properly limit the external debt capacity of a country with an ESF 
contract.
As can be seen, there are many risk assessment and contract engineering issues that need 
to be dealt with in designing ESF contracts. Our ADEMU work, building on current 
dynamic macro-contract quantitative theory, has developed the basic tools to make 
country risk assessments and to further develop ESF contracts. It will be the ESF’s task 
to tailor them, in their specific technical and legal details, and implement them. EU law 
(a change of the ESM Treaty may suffice) and political accountability (also possibly 
similar to the ESM) can, and should, define the operational framework of the ESF. In 
any case, the ESF should be responsible for its contracts and, correspondingly, for its 
balance sheet. This will provide credibility to the ESF in the execution of its contracts, 
since it will be in its own interest to preserve the safety of its assets, namely, the ESF 
contracts.
A short comment on how our ESF proposal relates to two existing proposals to reform 
the ESM. With respect to the European Commission’s proposal (European Commission 
2017b),3 our focus here is on the mission and design of the ESF and its contracts, not on 
3 See Chapter 10 of this eBook for a more in-depth discussion of the Commission’s proposal.
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whether it should be integrated into the EU Treaties or whether the ESM Treaty should 
simply be adapted, although the latter should suffice. More importantly, our proposal 
envisions a broader role for the ESF: to be the central institution to implement what 
the Commission calls the “Stabilisation Function” of the EMU (European Commission 
2017c). With respect to the French and German economists’ proposal (Bénassy-Quéré et 
al. 2018), we provide an overall framework into which their proposals for “a European 
fiscal capacity for large economic shocks” and “rainy-day fund providing liquidity” are 
integrated, and can be assessed; in particular, we consider constrained efficient, not just 
ad hoc, policies and contracts. It also differs in how fund contracts and ‘residual debt 
contracts’ should complement each other.
In summary, we have provided a theoretical and quantitative basis for the design of 
a European Stability Fund as a ‘constrained efficient mechanism’ which should 
substantially enhance the capacity of the European Union to: i) provide risk sharing 
and fiscal stabilisation in normal times; ii) provide insurance against severe country, 
or regional, shocks (in other words, the ESF would be a ‘robust crisis-management 
mechanism)’; iii) absorb existing risky sovereign debts and transform them into safe 
fund contracts (i.e. it would confront the ‘debt overhang’ problem); and iv) develop 
a safe EU fiscal institution (i.e. it would be able to issue the ‘safest’ EU asset in the 
international financial market). 
The strength of the design relies on considering the ESF as a key institution of the 
EMU, which is a ‘long-term partnership’ of sovereign countries. The credibility of 
the design relies on the fact that it accounts for existing EU constraints:  first, in the 
heterogeneity across member countries (their structure, policies and liabilities); and 
second, in the respect for ‘sovereignty’, which implies that it should always be in the 
interest of the participating countries – and of the ESF – to satisfy the contract; that 
is, to neither default on, nor renegotiate, it (although country risk profiles may, and 
should, be updated if needed). This, in turn, imposes ex ante and ex post limits on 
redistribution (there is no redistribution in our benchmark design). Furthermore, having 
independent national policies may result in moral hazard problems that cannot, indeed 
should not, be solved by imposing ‘austerity plans’ or financial fines. The flexibility 
of the design relies on the fact that it can be accommodated to different degrees of 
risk sharing, or levels of severity of the constraints (robustness), although this may be 
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at the cost of losing efficiency. Finally, the proposed ESF can be developed out of the 
existing European Stability Mechanism (for example, by modifying its Treaty), and 
steps towards this transformation should in fact be improvements with respect to its 
current capacity and practices (e.g. ESM contracts), which have already been proved to 
be very valuable in the resolution of the euro crisis.
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3 Agreeing to an unemployment 
insurance system for the euro 
area?
Árpád Ábrahám, João Brogueira de Sousa, Ramon Marimon 
and Lukas Mayr1
European University Institute
In this chapter we offer novel answers to three related questions: 
• What are the potential benefits of developing a European unemployment insurance 
system (EUIS)? 
• Could all the European countries involved benefit from a common, simple change 
to their current unemployment insurance systems? 
• Could unanimous agreement for this change be achieved without needing permanent 
transfers across countries? 
To properly address these questions, we first develop a dynamic equilibrium model 
with job search frictions, which provides a new characterisation of how different euro 
area labour markets are and therefore calls into question whether such an agreement can 
ever be reached. Nevertheless, our answer to the final question is: yes, it can be done!
Should the EU provide unemployment insurance?
The recent financial and sovereign debt crises have affected European labour markets 
asymmetrically, both in terms of duration and the severity of unemployment. In 
particular, stressed countries (such as Greece, Portugal and Spain) have experienced 
high levels of unemployment, making it very difficult, if not impossible, to provide 
1 This chapter is based on ADEMU Working Paper No. 2018/xxx (Ábrahám et al. 2018).
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adequate insurance for the unemployed while, at the same time, satisfying low-deficit 
commitments (the Fiscal Compact). Even if the EU economy is now growing, this 
does not mean that the scars of the crisis have healed, that resentment has receded, or 
that the European unemployment problems are problems of the past, and the question 
often asked is whether the EU can, and should, provide unemployment insurance. 
This has raised interest in proposals for a Europe-wide, or perhaps a euro area-wide, 
unemployment insurance system, which date back to the Marjolin Report (European 
Commission 1975), where a “Community Unemployment Benefit Fund” was first 
proposed. The European Commission has been working on this issue, and a “German-
Spanish proposal for a robust European Unemployment Insurance” (Dullien et al. 
2018) by a group of Members of the European Parliament, will soon be discussed in 
the Parliament. Quantitative and theoretical studies have also been presented in recent 
years, assessing the potential costs and benefits of an EUIS (Moyen et al. 2016, Dolls 
et al. 2018). 
As with any major social reform at the EU level, there is a polarised, and politicised, 
debate regarding the desirability of an EUIS. The proponents of such a new policy 
suggest that, in addition to improving solidarity and labour market integration, the 
system could provide insurance for country-specific shocks by pooling resources, 
thus allowing countries to go through crises without suffering the consequences of 
distortionary tax rises; the system could possibly also foster necessary labour reforms. 
Opponents say that UI policies should remain fully in the hands of the member states, 
and that such a system cannot ever be politically feasible (or desirable) as it would 
always imply permanent cross-subsidisation from countries with better labour market 
institutions (with low unemployment) to high-unemployment countries, which would 
therefore have even less incentive to reform their labour markets. 
Weighing up the costs and benefits across Europe
We take a step back and study quantitatively how these potential benefits and costs 
weigh against each other. Following Krusell et al. (2011), we use a dynamic general 
equilibrium model with job search frictions to analyse workers’ stocks and flows across 
labour market states (employment, unemployment and inactivity) in order to assess the 
impact of an EUIS under alternative unemployment insurance policies. Our analysis 
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provides a parsimonious way of comparing labour market institutions across Europe. 
Our first finding is not new but our simple representation is: there are large and systematic 
differences that can be summarised by how a few labour market frictions differ across 
labour markets. Almost surprisingly, in spite of the differences, our model suggests 
that welfare-maximising unemployment benefit policies are very similar among the 
countries that have been analysed: in all countries, a long duration of unemployment 
benefits and a relatively low replacement rate of around 15% is welfare-improving, 
compared to the status quo. The resulting tax differences across countries reflect their 
structural labour market differences, in terms of job creation and destruction.  These tax 
differences also provide clear incentives for labour market reforms. 
As part of the ADEMU research project, we provide the first assessment of an EUIS 
that takes into account individual agents’ optimal reactions to changes in UI policies in 
terms of labour supply, job search effort, labour market participation and private savings 
decisions, across different euro area countries. Moreover, we describe the necessary 
changes in taxes – in the long run and in the short run in response to shocks – that would 
finance different specifications of UI systems. Using a dynamic general equilibrium 
model, we show how taxes and unemployment benefit policies affect agents’ private 
decisions and how these private decisions shape aggregate responses to policies. We 
carry out this assessment on the basis of a multi-country model of EU labour markets 
that takes into account institutional differences across countries, as well as current 
country-specific national unemployment insurance policies (labour income tax, benefit 
replacement rate and duration of benefit receipt). The model successfully replicates 
the observed long-term heterogeneity in labour market outcomes (employment and 
unemployment rates, duration of unemployment spells, flows across employment 
states, and so on). Our analysis highlights the fact that taking into account inactivity 
and the distortionary effect of the taxes financing the unemployment insurance system 
is crucial to understanding both the aggregate and distributional implications of 
unemployment insurance policies. The structural model parameters provide a unique 
diagnosis of European labour market institutions and UI policies, and allow for a 
meaningful comparison across European countries. Figure 1 shows the heterogeneity 
in exogenous job arrival rates for the unemployed who actively search for a job versus 
inactive agents. Figure 2 depicts the heterogeneity in unemployment benefit policies 
across Europe (replacement rate versus maximum duration of benefits).
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Figure 1 Labour market institutions (model)
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Figure 2 Unemployment benefit policy (data)
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On the basis of this calibration, we perform a set of policy experiments. In the political 
debate, proponents of a common European unemployment insurance system often 
emphasise the risk-sharing benefits of such a system. Business cycles are not perfectly 
synchronised across Europe and recessionary countries often have difficulties raising 
the funds for increased expenditures on unemployment benefits without violating the 
regulatory (Fiscal Compact) rules of the EU. Our first experiment therefore targets a 
quantitative evaluation of the potential pure risk-sharing benefits of an EUIS. To this 
end, we compute the labour market and welfare consequences of a deep recession in 
two alternative scenarios: (i) the government is in financial autarky and needs to raise 
taxes on the employed in order to maintain a balanced UB budget; and (ii) the country 
is insured against increased unemployment and can go through the recession without 
raising taxes. Otherwise, we assume that the unemployment insurance system remains 
the same in all countries in both cases. 
We find that the risk-sharing benefits resulting from the welfare differences of the 
second scenario with respect to the first one are small (less than 0.1% consumption 
equivalent variation for each country), and marginally higher for the employed, whose 
taxes are smoother, than for the unemployed, whose benefits do not change. This 
experiment is purposefully constructed to provide an upper bound for the true benefits. 
The experiment implies that although insurance benefits exist, their small size may not 
justify the introduction of an EUIS, unless other factors increase its value.
In light of this result, one may doubt the desirability of a European unemployment 
insurance system; even more so as the observed heterogeneity in labour market 
institutions (see Figure 1) suggests that the optimal benefit systems could differ 
substantially across European countries, making it difficult for governments to reach a 
common ground. To evaluate this claim, we compute the optimal unilateral reform of 
the unemployment benefit system (financed at the national level) separately for each 
country. We find that the optimal mix of replacement rate, and duration of unemployment 
benefits, is surprisingly similar across the countries studied. 
All countries would benefit from an unlimited duration of benefit receipt, and almost all 
countries a replacement rate of between 10% and 20% (the exceptions are France and 
Luxembourg, with optimal replacement rates of 30% and 40%, respectively). In addition, 
for every single country, a reform of this type (unlimited duration and replacement 
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rate at anything between 10% and 20%) would lead to welfare gains compared to the 
status quo. These policies provide better insurance against unemployment shocks as 
they eliminate the risk of losing eligibility before finding a job. At the same time, the 
relatively low replacement rate will keep the tax burden – and hence labour market 
distortions – low.  The main difference in the optimal policies is thus the tax rate needed 
to finance the very similar benefit systems. Taken together, these results suggest that 
European governments may be able to reach a consensus on introducing a minimal 
harmonised European benefit system (potentially with the possibility for national 
governments to complement it with additional benefits).
Table 1 shows the average welfare gains2 (in percent of consumption equivalent variation) 
of introducing such a harmonised system (unlimited duration and a replacement rate 
of 15%). The last column presents the payroll tax rates that national governments need 
to charge wage earners in order to avoid permanent cross-country transfers. These tax 
differences across countries mostly reflect their structural labour market differences 
which are kept constant, in terms of job creation and destruction, and they may serve as 
an incentive device for labour market reforms. The elimination of permanent transfers 
through varying contribution payments is a necessity in order to reach a consensus 
across European countries. As Figure 3 shows, aggregate employment remains stable 
(the same is true for all the large countries, but not for all small ones) but there is 
a small transfer from inactivity to unemployment. Table 2 shows the welfare gains 
if the same harmonised benefit system were to be financed jointly with common tax 
rates at the European level. Austria, France and Luxembourg would be likely to oppose 
the introduction of such a system. Interestingly, some of the net payers (Germany, 
Belgium, Finland and Ireland) would still prefer the reform, indicating that the current 
tax-benefit system in some countries is far from optimal. Hence, they would benefit 
from longer eligibility and lower replacement rates (lower taxes), although they would 
pay permanent transfers into the system.
2 The present value welfare gains from the introduction of the reform to the convergence of the economy, where the union 
of the ten countries is a closed economy, i.e. interest rates are endogenous.
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Table 1 Welfare gains (% of consumption equivalent variation) and tax rates (%)
Employed Unemployed Inactive Total Tax Rate 
Austria 0.21 0.51 0.24 0.23 0.73
Belgium 1.05 -0.24 0.81 0.92 0.45
Germany 0.34 0.44 0.28 0.38 1.27
Spain 0.65 0.65 0.58 0.62 2.53
Finland 2.09 1.83 1.90 2.03 0.22
France 0.11 0.18 0.09 0.11 1.23
Ireland 0.77 1.31 0.73 0.79 1.34
Italy 0.48 1.58 0.51 0.60 1.90
Luxembourg 0.30 0.51 0.33 0.32 0.55
Netherlands 0.06 0.13 0.03 0.08 1.57
Table 2 Welfare gains (% of consumption equivalent variation), tax rate (%) and 
transfers (in % of GDP)
Employed Unemployed Inactive Total Tax rate Transfer
Austria -0.31 -0.05 -0.28 -0.29 1.47 -0.51
Belgium 0.36 -1.01 0.18 0.25 1.47 -0.71
Germany 0.16 0.79 0.14 0.20 1.47 -0.14
Spain 1.51 1.42 1.31 1.45 1.47 0.74
Finland 1.11 0.63 0.92 1.04 1.47 -0.87
France -0.06 -0.02 -0.08 -0.06 1.47 -0.16
Ireland 0.66 1.07 0.63 0.68 1.47 -0.09
Italy 0.75 2.13 0.76 0.87 1.47 0.29
Luxembourg -0.43 -0.20 -0.34 -0.40 1.47 -0.64
Netherlands 0.14 0.55 0.12 0.17 1.47 0.07
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Figure 3 Employment, unemployment and inactivity after the EUIS reform
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Should we introduce a common European unemployment insurance system? Our 
results show that the risk-sharing benefits seem to be very low and by themselves would 
be unlikely to provide a strong enough rationale for the introduction of such a system, 
although we do not account for additional benefits that a common UI system can 
provide in terms of labour market integration and mobility. At the same time, we also 
show that despite the large differences across European labour markets, the optimal 
unemployment insurance policies are remarkably similar, and the gains to be made by 
changing the current UI systems in a common direction are substantial. If the permanent 
differences in labour market institutions (and consequently in unemployment rates) are 
neutralised by country-specific tax rates, a common system could improve welfare in 
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all countries. This implies that the cross-subsidisation problem can be dealt with by an 
‘experience rating’ system, where countries’ contribution to the common pool depends 
on their long-run unemployment rate. 
An EUIS could be implemented through the existing national UI systems with the 
support  of an EUIS Fund absorbing deficits and surpluses due to unemployment 
deviations from the ‘national unemployment steady state’. The contract between the 
fund and a national UI system can be designed to be revenue neutral (see Chapter 2).
In sum, according to our analysis the main advantage of an EUIS is twofold. 
• First, it allows member countries to move towards a more efficient unemployment 
insurance system, while there may be non-properly accounted general equilibrium 
effects and political constraints to moving in this direction individually. 
• Second, the differential tax rates associated with the EUIS would provide a 
transparent way of assessing the benefits of labour market reforms for the member 
countries.3 
Furthermore, member countries can always improve upon the common system if they 
wish – for example, by increasing their replacement rates – and an EUIS can also 
enhance labour cohesion and mobility across EU participating countries, and social 
identity with the EU, which is exactly in the spirit of the original proposal of the 
Marjolin Report of 1975!
3 This design avoids moral hazard problems present in other formulations; see Jung et al. (2017) for a model where there 
are ample possibilities for moral hazard distortions.
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4 Macroeconomic stabilisation in 
heterogeneous societies
Morten O. Ravn
University College London, CEPR and Centre for Macroeconomics
ADEMU has been heavily engaged in developing new models for macroeconomic 
stabilisation which combine frictions in goods and labour markets, typically stressed 
in the monetary economics literature, with incomplete asset markets, stressed in the 
literature that has considered distributional issues. When these features are combined, 
new implications arise for macroeconomic stabilisation. This chapter reviews some of 
these issues and argues that stabilisation policy is particularly important in the face 
of idiosyncratic risk and incomplete markets because of the amplification that can 
arise through countercyclical earnings risk, and because of a new source of interaction 
between monetary and fiscal policies.
A new generation of macroeconomic models 
A new generation of models have made their way into macroeconomics: models that 
combine frictions in goods and labour markets with incomplete asset markets and 
idiosyncratic risk, Heterogeneous Agents New Keynesian (HANK) and HANK + 
search and matching (HANK&SAM) models. This new generation of macro models 
not only allow researchers to bridge the gap between microeconomic evidence on 
consumption and savings choices, but also offer new insights into macroeconomic 
stabilisation policy. Furthermore, the new models potentially resolve a host of issues 
that have haunted the macro model’s standard representative agent-based macro  in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis. 
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Representative agent New Keynesian models, the hallmark of much of macroeconomics 
until recently, are attractive for computational reasons because households and 
entrepreneurs are subject to only aggregate risk. In such settings, stabilisation policy 
needs to address the imperfections in goods and labour markets which distort the economy 
and prevent prices and wages from adjusting towards their frictionless hypotheticals. 
In much of this literature, monetary policy is a powerful tool for stabilisation purposes, 
while fiscal policy often can be constrained to targeting inefficiencies due to market 
power (and possibly to correcting for externalities) subject to monetary-fiscal 
coordination issues. The latter would typically induce a need to delegate a ‘passive’ role 
for one instrument and an ‘active’ role for another, such as the typical macroeconomic 
framework that involves monetary policy aiming at price stability and fiscal policy 
ensuring government solvency. These models leave little role for distributional issues 
(which perceivably may matter much for stabilisation), do not provide a good account 
of income, consumption and savings patterns observed in household data, and have 
problems explaining important features of the recent crisis such as outcomes with 
persistently low levels of activity, short-term nominal interest rates at or close to their 
lower bound but positive inflation. Moreover, in these models there is little interaction 
between demand and supply because of (the indirectly or directly assumed possibilities 
for) insurance opportunities, which shields agents from risks apart from those directly 
related to aggregate shocks.
Recently, a literature has developed which has combined the frictions in goods and 
labour markets stressed in the representative agent models with financial market 
incompleteness and idiosyncratic risk. This includes a large number of contributions 
from ADEMU such as Bayer et al. (2017), den Haan et al. (2018), Luetticke (2017), and 
Ravn and Sterk (2017, 2018). It also formed the basis of an ADEMU conference which 
was held at UCL in May 2017. The essential new ingredient of HANK models is that 
households operate in environments where they are subject not only to aggregate shocks 
but also to idiosyncratic income, and where they lack insurance against such shocks. 
A simplifying assumption made in some of this new literature is that the idiosyncratic 
risk faced by households is ‘exogeneous’. Nonetheless, because of imperfect insurance, 
idiosyncratic risk matters for whether households are liquidity constrained or not and 
this, in turn, matters for macroeconomic outcomes and policy. In such environments, 
there will typically be rich distributional dynamics that reflect the extent to which 
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agents – through luck or behaviour – have been subject to shocks over time. By itself, 
such inequality may motivate new policy concerns, as monetary and fiscal policies 
in general will have distributional consequences. However, in terms of the aggregate 
consequences, the main difference between HANK models and representative agent 
models is the way in which policies matter for aggregate outcomes. 
In standard New Keynesian models, monetary policy operates through manipulating 
expectations and through impacting directly on real interest rates, which in turn affect 
intertemporal allocations through standard consumption-smoothing channels. In 
HANK-type models, instead, monetary policy also influences consumption streams for 
those who are (or anticipate becoming) liquidity constrained through the effects on 
the intertemporal income stream. This literature has stressed that this channel is extra 
important in settings with illiquid assets (Luetticke 2017). Indeed, it is often the case 
that this indirect channel becomes dominant when carefully calibrating these models. 
Moreover, because Ricardian equivalence fails in these models, the interaction between 
monetary and fiscal policy becomes very important. In particular, in HANK models 
fiscal policies that impact directly on household income, such as taxes or transfers, will 
tend to reinforce the (indirect) impact of monetary policy, while policies that adjust 
debt will tend to moderate the distributional channels.
The implications from endogeneous risk
The new literature has even richer implications when earnings risk is endogenous. One 
channel of such risk is unemployment; another is wage risk. Consider a setting where 
matching frictions prevent continuous clearing of the labour market and give rise to 
frictional unemployment. Assume also, realistically, that households cannot perfectly 
insure against unemployment. Because of the matching frictions, jobs are easier to 
find in booms than in recessions, which induces countercyclical earnings risk. On the 
other hand, workers may have more to lose in booms if wages are procyclical. This 
source introduces a procyclical endogenous risk channel. Which of these channels 
dominates will have consequences for a large number of issues – countercyclical risk 
tends to amplify shocks to the economy because demand contracts in bad times when 
workers perceive a high risk of unemployment, and vice versa in booms. When risk is 
procyclical instead, demand boosts the economy in bad times as workers perceive that 
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the income loss from losing their job may be smaller than in booms. Ravn and Sterk 
(2018) argue that empirically, real wages tend not to fluctuate much over the business 
cycle while the risk associated with job loss is strongly countercyclical. Hence, the 
endogenous risk channel tends to be countercyclical.
Such endogenous countercyclical earnings risk has a host of implications deriving 
from a new interaction between  the demand and supply sides of the economy. When 
households lack insurance against unemployment, they have a precautionary savings 
motive which contracts demand when labour market conditions weaken. This, in turn, 
induces a contraction in goods demand – over and above the mere income losses of 
those who lose their jobs – because employed households worry about the potential 
consequences of job losses. Firms can react to such a contraction in demand in a 
variety of ways, but due to labour and goods market frictions, they will reduce their 
labour demand. Lower labour demand, in turn, implies even higher job loss risk on 
the part of employed households, which motivates even stronger precautionary savings 
demand. Hence, due to the countercyclical endogenous earnings risk, HANK&SAM 
models introduce an amplification mechanism through a supply-side and demand-side 
interaction. Ravn and Sterk (2017) show that this mechanism can help understand why 
the increase in job losses at the beginning of the financial crisis set off an extended 
period of poor labour market conditions and rising long-term unemployment. Ravn and 
Sterk (2017) also argue that a stronger policy response to the crisis could have partially 
neutralised the demand channel and stabilised the economy.
In environments where the endogenous earnings risk is sufficiently important, 
the economy may be sensitive to bad long equilibria that involve low activity, high 
unemployment, and low but positive inflation. Ravn and Sterk (2018) discuss that such 
long-run equilibria, or ‘unemployment traps’, resemble secular stagnation outcomes. 
In the HANK&SAM setting, these outcomes derive from households worrying about 
adverse labour market outcomes, which can be self-fulfilling when precautionary 
savings motives are sufficient strong. Such bad outcomes can be avoided most directly 
by providing sufficient insurance against adverse income shocks for households (i.e. 
through unemployment benefits). Hence, stabilisation policy is important not only 
for short- to medium-term outcomes, but may also help insulate the economy from 
potentially long-lasting slumps.
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The presence of countercyclical endogenous earnings risk also implies that monetary 
policy will have to be designed to generate more stabilisation than is dictated by the 
well-known ‘Taylor principle’. This principle essentially insures against self-fulfilling 
equilibria in the vicinity of equilibrium by making real interest rates and inflation move 
together in response to fluctuations in the economy. In incomplete market settings, such 
a policy may not be sufficient to root out other equilibria because of the interaction 
between the demand side and the supply side of the economy and precautionary 
savings. In particular, when nominal rigidities and precautionary savings motives are 
both strong, monetary policy needs to be extra aggressive to stabilise the economy.
Interaction between the demand and supply sides
The interaction between the demand side and the supply side that generates 
countercyclical earnings risk has other interesting implications. One issue concerns the 
inflationary impact of supply side shocks such as technology shocks. In traditional New 
Keynesian models, technology shocks impact on marginal costs, and stabilisation policy 
involves stabilising these. In such settings, higher productivity means lower inflation. In 
HANK&SAM models with countercyclical endogenous risk, higher productivity also 
spurs higher labour demand, which in turn lowers job risk and thus stimulates goods 
demand. This latter channel, in turn, implies that higher productivity may induce higher 
inflation. For the same reason, liquidity traps (periods where nominal interest rates are 
at or close to their lower bound) may occur at positive inflation rates if monetary policy 
responds not only to inflation but also to outcomes such as unemployment. 
This latter implication is interesting empirically. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, 
as the economy slumped, short-term nominal interest rates went close to their lower 
bound and remained there for an extended period. Yet inflation, while low, remained 
positive in the euro area as well as in other major economies such as the UK and the 
US. This feature is hard to explain in standard representative agent models used for 
policymaking since the liquidity trap in such models is accompanied by deflation. 
Specifically, in these models, the slump in activity in a liquidity trap occurs as a process 
of low demand driving down inflation and nominal interest rates until eventually 
nominal rates cannot fall any lower, at which point the economy becomes deflationary 
and activity slumps. In the new generation of models, the slump in activity also induces 
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an increase in earnings risk due to rising unemployment, which depresses demand 
although inflation may be positive. It is this precautionary savings motive that can lead 
the economy into a liquidity trap with low, but positive, inflation. 
Avoiding such outcomes again hinges both on monetary and fiscal policies giving 
stabilisation policy a key role in the economy. Interestingly, in such settings, supply-side 
reforms may help the economy recover as their impact on labour demand may induce 
increased goods demand, thus helping to stimulate the economy. Interestingly, in the 
standard representative agent model, supply-side reforms may be counterproductive in 
liquidity traps. The reason is that supply-side reforms will tend to drive down inflation 
because of the impact on the marginal costs of production. Even lower inflation, in turn, 
increases real interest rates, reducing demand. In contrast, in the face of incomplete 
markets, supply-side reform, by reducing unemployment, can stimulate inflation 
because this alleviates the precautionary savings motive which can drive up goods 
demand.
Conclusion
In summary, the new generation of models have many implications for the design of 
monetary and fiscal policies that need to be considered by policymakers. Providing 
insurance against adverse shocks – for example, through unemployment insurance and 
other channels – is important for stabilising the demand side of the economy, monetary 
policy becomes extra important for neutralising the amplification mechanism, monetary-
fiscal interaction is key not only in terms of providing anchors but also in terms of 
implications for demand deriving indirectly through household income, and welfare 
issues related to uncertainty and inequality matters for the design of optimal policies.
No doubt the new literature will develop rapidly over the coming years, but it already 
appears to be on track to replace the representative agent New Keynesian model.
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5 Recessions following expansions: 
The instability of market 
economies
Paul Beaudry, Dana Galizia and Franck Portier
Vancouver School of Economics, University of British Columbia and NBER;  
Carleton University; University College London and CEPR
The US financial crisis and the euro crisis were both preceded by expansions and 
followed by recessions. These episodes are recent manifestations of a more general 
feature: market economies repeatedly go through recessions and expansions.  The 
dominant paradigm used by central banks and governments to understand such 
fluctuations is based on the belief that the economy is fundamentally stable and that 
business cycles predominantly reflect the effects of outside forces that, in many cases, 
can and should be countered by appropriate stabilisation policies. 
Conventional wisdom interprets the last 30 years of macroeconomic fluctuations in 
developed economies in the following way. In the middle of the 1980s, developed 
economies entered a Great Moderation in which macroeconomic volatility decreased. 
This stability has been interpreted as the consequence of both smaller shocks and better 
stabilisation policies, particularly better monetary policies. This view of an ‘end to 
business cycle history’ was dramatically contradicted by the 2007 Great Recession, 
which put the role of the financial sector front and centre as a source of shocks and as a 
mechanism for amplification and propagation. 
The theoretical foundations of this view – incarnated by Smets and Wouter (2007) for 
the pre-Great Recession period, and by Christiano et al. (2015) for the Great Recession 
period – are as follows. The economy is fundamentally stable, with market forces 
acting to push it towards a smooth growth path. That smooth growth path is determined 
by technological, demographic, and social change (the emergence of information 
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technology, the increase of life expectancy, the increase in female labour market 
participation, and so on). Business cycles consist of fluctuations around that smooth 
trend that are caused exclusively by the arrival of random shocks; if there were no 
shocks, the endogenous stabilising forces would cause the economy to converge to its 
trend. As Prescott (1999) wrote, “[t]he Marxian view is that capitalistic economies are 
inherently unstable and that excessive accumulation of capital will lead to increasingly 
severe economic crises. Growth theory, which has proved to be empirically successful, 
says this is not true. The capitalistic economy is stable, and absent some change in 
technology or the rules of the economic game, the economy converges to a constant 
growth path with the standard of living doubling every 40 years.”
Such a view is compatible with the theoretical results in the applied general equilibrium 
literature, according to which the growth path or steady state is stable, and fluctuations 
around it are therefore only caused by shocks. This in turn justifies the idea that one 
can think of the economy as being at most times in a neighbourhood of its steady 
state. It also justifies the restriction to linear approximations around the steady state, 
which is computationally convenient, in particular when one needs to estimate dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. As Blanchard (2014) wrote, “[w]e in 
the field did think of the economy as roughly linear, constantly subject to different 
shocks, constantly fluctuating, but naturally returning to its steady state over time”.
Challenging the conventional wisdom
In our recent research, we challenge this view that fluctuations are the consequences of 
shocks pushing the economy away from a stable steady state. We do so by providing 
new evidence, proposing a new conceptual framework, and developing new solution 
techniques (Beaudry et al. 2016a, 2016b, Galizia 2018). Although we study a set of 
developed economies, we will focus here on our results for the US economy.  
First, we argue that the business cycle is well captured by the fluctuations in the 
intensity of factor usage. We therefore look at variables such as hours worked per capita, 
employment and unemployment rates, capacity utilisation. Because these variables do 
not tend to grow over long periods of time, the problem of how to decompose a variable 
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into its trend and cycle components is much less of a statistical issue, in contrast, for 
example, to output per capita.
When looking at such variables, there is much less evidence of a Great Moderation, 
and business cycles appear to be somewhat regular, typically lasting around 10 years. 
More formally, we show evidence of a significant peak in the spectral density of such 
cyclical variables. This cycle has a slightly longer period than the two-to-eight years 
definition generally adopted in the literature, and is likely to be discarded by usual 
filtering methods.
The existence of a peak in spectral density contrasts with the common wisdom since 
Granger (1969) that there are no peaks in the spectral density of macroeconomic 
variables at business cycle frequencies, and that the business cycle is mainly defined by 
co-movements. The finding of recurrent cycles with a 10-year period has two possible 
explanations: the exogenous shocks themselves display such recurrence (which would 
require them to have a fairly rich dynamic structure), or it is embedded in the economy’s 
internal mechanisms. It is hard to observe proxies for exogenous shocks. When one 
does – for example, with corrected total factor productivity – one does not find such rich 
dynamics. We therefore follow the second route and search for endogenous dynamics 
that are capable of making the economy intrinsically cyclical.
An intrinsically cyclical economy is indeed an economy in which expansion and 
recessions are linked, in the sense that the expansion is sowing the seeds of the next 
recession (and vice versa). This property can be found in an old tradition of non-micro-
founded models (Kalecki 1937, Kaldor 1940, Hicks 1950, Goodwin 1951), but not in 
the typical modern DSGE models. 
Our second contribution is to present a general class of model that can generate 
endogenous cyclicality. Three features are essential: complementarities between agents, 
accumulation, and sluggishness. Because of complementarities, each economic agent 
tends to choose a higher level of action (consumption, investment in durable goods and 
capital or hiring depending on the model) when the others are also doing so, thereby 
creating powerful amplification forces. Because of accumulation, deviations from the 
steady state do not last forever. At some point, the economy hits the decreasing marginal 
returns (e.g. for labour or capital) or decreasing marginal utility (e.g. for durables), 
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and as a result it does not move away from the steady state indefinitely. Because of 
sluggishness, the swings from above to below the steady state and back are not too 
frequent, so that fluctuations at the frequencies highlighted in the data can occur. 
In this abstract class of model, we propose a specific explanation that shares many 
features with the mechanisms highlighted by Morten Ravn in Chapter 4 of this eBook. 
The complementarity between agents is created by the incompleteness of financial 
markets. In an economy where consumers face a risk of unemployment that is largely 
uninsurable, everyone is encouraged to spend more when others are spending more, 
since larger aggregate expenditure reduces unemployment, which in turn lowers an 
individual agent’s own risk of losing her job. As a result, each individual can reduce her 
level of precautionary savings and spend more. In equilibrium, then, an agent spends 
more when others spend more. This mechanism is able to produce cyclical forces 
when coupled with the accumulation of durable goods and residential investment. 
The endogenous cyclical forces are generated by individually rational decisions that 
generate a socially costly instability. There is therefore room for stabilisation policy. 
The sequence of expansions and recessions is explained as follows: at the end of 
the recession, the stock of real estate and durable goods is depreciated, so that some 
agents decide to spend (to replace an old car, for example, or to eventually decide to 
purchase a larger or better located house) even though the risk of unemployment is 
still high. In doing so, they increase expenditures, which tends to increase production 
and employment, and thus to reduce unemployment risk, pushing other agents to 
reduce their precautionary savings and spend more as well. This expansion does not 
stop when the socially optimal level of housing and durable goods is reached, because 
each individual has a desire to spend, even though each of them rationally understands 
that the inevitable future recession is likely to be larger when the stock of houses and 
durable goods is large. When households decide to slow down their accumulation by 
reducing their spending, they create an increase in unemployment, and thus an increase 
in precautionary savings which reduces spending even more, thereby amplifying the 
initial decrease in spending. The economy is then in a state of deficient demand, and a 
vicious spiral is triggered. The economy goes into recession, which lasts until stocks 
of houses and durable goods are sufficiently reduced for agents to start spending more. 
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As a result of the above mechanisms, it is possible in principle for multiple steady 
states and/or sunspot equilibria to emerge. In our analysis, we focus on cases in 
which complementarities are ‘weak’, meaning that there is a unique steady state and 
that trajectories are determinate. Nevertheless, weak complementarities can generate 
strong centrifugal forces close to the steady state, causing it to lose local stability. From 
bifurcation theory, we then know that a limit cycle will exist in the global dynamics 
(i.e. in the non-linearised version of the model). The economy then perpetually cycles 
without shocks. The steady state is unstable, but the model is not globally explosive. 
Absent any shocks, the cycle would be fully predictable. It is reasonable to believe, 
however, that the economy is also continually affected by events such as changes in 
perceptions, in expectations, changes in technology and so on, so that the length and the 
amplitude of the cycle will vary in a unpredictable way. 
This ‘stochastic limit cycle’ environment is not simply a theoretical curiosity, and we 
show that, when estimated, the model parameters are in the zone in which these limit 
cycles appear. Shocks are still needed, however, not to create fluctuations but rather to 
make them less predictable. Our third contribution is to develop a way to solve for such 
saddle-path-stable limit cycles (see Galizia 2018 for a detailed exposition). 
Policy implications
Such a view of economic instability has drastic implications for economic policy, as 
it changes our assessment of the best stabilisation policies in a recession. Because 
expansion phases tend to be too long, the economy almost necessarily ends up in a 
situation of over-accumulation (of capital, houses, and durable goods). There is then 
some truth in the Hayekian view on the need to ‘liquidate’ capital. Sustaining aggregate 
demand through stimulation policies is in a sense useless, as it simply postpones the 
recovery. For example, a policy of supporting the construction sector in Spain in 2008 
would have been unproductive, since nearly 30% of the 3.5 million housing units built 
since 2001 were vacant. However, there is no guarantee that the liquidation driven purely 
by market forces would be socially optimal. In the economy that we have sketched in 
the previous paragraph, we can show formally that liquidations are inefficiently severe 
because, at root, the effect of individual spending decisions on aggregate unemployment 
risk not internalised. Although expenditure must be reduced, the economy is in a 
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situation of deficient demand, causing the recession to be too abrupt. In that sense, 
some Keynesian-type demand policy is desirable. This will slow down the liquidation 
and prolong the recession, but that path will be less costly because unemployment will 
be lower. There is a trade-off between the length and the severity of the recession, and 
the market does not choose the right balance between the two.
Such mechanisms, in a non-linear model, can also contribute to the debate on ‘secular 
stagnation’ launched by Summers (2013). Decentralised economies work well when 
they are far enough below their steady growth path – the capital stock (productive capital, 
housing, durable goods) is relatively low compared to the level of technology, which 
causes spending to be high and unemployment low, so that the absence of insurance 
against unemployment risk is almost irrelevant. But when the economy is prosperous 
and fluctuates around its stationary growth path, its capital needs are largely met (not 
in absolute terms, but relative to the level of technology) and the economy thus exists 
in a very different regime. Unemployment is high in recessions, demand is insufficient, 
and the economy displays endogenous cycles. It is somehow the fate of prosperous 
economies to go through booms and busts and to be in chronically deficient demand. 
If technological progress slows down, the economy finds itself in a situation of excess 
capital (relative to this new technological path), and therefore, through the mechanisms 
previously described, in a structural deficit of demand. However, such deficient demand 
cannot be eliminated by aggregate demand policy. Boosting demand would increase 
the stock of capital, housing, and durable goods, and therefore ultimately aggravate the 
shortfall in demand.  
References
Blanchard, O J (2014),  “Where Danger Lurks”, Finance & Development 51(3): 28-31.
Beaudry, P, D Galizia and F Portier (2016a), “Is the Macroeconomy Locally Unstable 
and Why Should We Care?”, NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2016, Volume 31, 
Washington, DC: National Bureau of Economic Research, pp. 479-530.
Recessions following expansions: The instability of market economies
Paul Beaudry, Dana Galizia and Franck Portier
59
Beaudry, P, D Galizia and F Portier (2016b), “Putting the Cycle Back into Business 
Cycle Analysis”, ADEMU Working Paper No. 2018/92 and NBER Working Paper No. 
22825.
Beaudry, P, D Galizia and F Portier (2018), “Reconciling Hayek’s and Keynes Views 
of Recessions”, ADEMU Working Paper No. 2016/57; also The Review of Economic 
Studies 85(1): 119–156.
Christiano, L, M Eichenbaum and M Trabandt (2015), “Understanding the Great 
Recession”, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 7(1): 110-167.
Galizia, D (2018), “Saddle Cycles: Solving Rational Expectations Models Featuring 
Limit Cycles (or Chaos) Using Perturbation Methods”, mimeo, Carleton University.
Goodwin, R (1951), “The Nonlinear Accelerator and the Persistence of Business 
Cycles”, Econometrica 19(1): 1–17.
Granger, C W J (1966), “The Typical Spectral Shape of an Economic Variable”, 
Econometrica 34(1): 150–161.
Hicks, J (1950), A Contribution to the Theory of the Trade Cycle, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press.
Kaldor, N (1940), “A Model of the Trade Cycle”, The Economic Journal 50(197): 78–
92.
Kalecki, M (1937), “A Theory of the Business Cycle”, The Review of Economic Studies 
4(2): 77–97.
Prescott, E (1999), “Some observations on the Great Depression”, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, Winter: 25-29. 
Smets, F and R Wouters (2007), “Shocks and Frictions in US Business Cycles: A 
Bayesian DSGE Approach”, American Economic Review 97(3): 586-606.
Summers, L (2013), “On Secular Stagnation”, speech at the IMF Research Conference, 
8 November.
The EMU after the Euro Crisis: Lessons and Possibilities
60
About the authors
Paul Beaudry is a Professor of Economics and Canada Research Chair in 
Macroeconomics at the Vancouver School of Economics. He does research related 
to business cycles, inflation, financial markets, the macro-economic effects of 
technological change, and the determinants of aggregate employment and wages. Paul 
Beaudry obtained his Ph.D. from Princeton University. He has held faculty positions at 
Oxford University, Boston University and the Universite de Montreal. He has also been 
a Visiting Professor at MIT, Paris-Sorbonne and the Toulouse School of Economics.
Dana Galizia is an Assistant Professor of Economics at Carleton University. His 
research interests are business cycles and macroeconometrics. He has worked on 
understanding the macroeconomic effects of unemployment risk, and on developing 
methods to estimate the importance of different potential causes of business cycles. 
Dana Galizia obtained his PhD from the University of British Columbia in September 
2015.
Franck Portier is a Professor of Economics at University College London and 
affiliated to the Toulouse School of Economics. He is also Senior Member of the 
Institut Universitaire de France. He is interested in macroeconomics. In particular, he 
has been working intensively on the macroeconomic impact of changes in perceptions 
about the future. Franck Portier obtained his Ph.D. from Université Paris I Panthéon-
Sorbonne. He has held faculty positions at Toulouse School of Economics, CREST 
and CEPREMAP. He has also been a Visiting Professor at the University of British 
Columbia and held a visiting position at the Banque de France.
61
6 Stimulus packages? 
Better be persistent!
Martial Dupaigne and Patrick Fève
Toulouse School of Economics
The financial and euro crises have reignited interest in whether fiscal stimulus is an 
effective policy to bring the economy back on trend. We show that the answer to this 
question crucially depends on how persistent the fiscal policy is. The interplay between 
expectations regarding future government spending and capital accumulation deeply 
affect the size of fiscal multipliers.
So-called (short-run) government spending multipliers, i.e. the response of current GDP 
to a unit increase in government spending, remain surrounded in empirical uncertainty 
(see Ramey 2011 for a survey) and vary with many factors such as the econometric 
approach, the identification strategy, the structural model, the state of the economy, 
and the nature and duration of the fiscal change (e.g. Cogan et al. 2010, Uhlig 2010, 
Christiano et al. 2011, Leeper et al. 2011, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2012, Coenen 
et al. 2012, Fève et al. 2013, Erceg and Lindé 2014, Canzoneri et al. 2016, Fève, and 
Sahuc 2016, Pappa et al. 2016, Ramey and Zubairy 2018).
Government spending forecastability shapes fiscal 
multipliers
Recent research has studied how the predictability of fiscal spending affects fiscal 
multipliers. Mc Kay and Reis (2016a, 2016b) focus on automatic stabilisers, such as 
unemployment insurance, which use stable rules to condition transfers to the state of 
economy. In Dupaigne and Fève (2016), we show that the forecastability of government 
purchases crucially shapes fiscal multipliers. Future predicted government spending 
drives investment following usual factor demand concerns, combined with crowding 
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out-like capital supply effects. A very short-lasting fiscal stimulus lacks any incentive to 
invest, as opposed to a more persistent stimulus. In the same vein, announced increases 
in government spending yield larger investment responses than unexpected ones.
The analytical tool we use to analyse the time profile of government spending is a 
relatively simple model including capital accumulation, elastic labour supply and 
stochastic government purchases. This model is sufficiently simple to get exact solutions 
that provide insightful analytical results. It nevertheless shares the key ingredients 
present in the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) literature (as in Coenen 
et al. 2012): the utility is separable between consumption and leisure (consumption 
and leisure are deliberately maintained as normal goods), a constant return-to-scale 
technology combines labour and capital inputs, and the stochastic process of non–
productive government spending is exogenous and persistent. 
With this laboratory in hand, we show that the persistence of government spending 
shapes short-run multipliers through the response of private investment. How does this 
investment channel operate? The fiscal stimulus, which acts as a drain on resources, 
has two opposite effects on investment. On the one hand, households want to smooth 
their consumption and eat into part of the existing capital (a crowding out-like effect). 
On the other hand, it stimulates employment (in our setup, through a standard negative 
wealth effect) and the marginal productivity of capital, increasing the demand for 
capital services. What matter for capital accumulation and investment are in fact the 
expectations of next-period labour input. The more persistent the shock, the larger is that 
expectation. Capital accumulation is therefore desirable when government spending and 
employment are highly persistent, while households facing very temporary fiscal shocks 
exhibit negative savings. When the persistence parameter of government spending is 
equal to the degree of smoothing in equilibrium consumption, the crowding-out and 
crowding-in effects exactly cancel out. Conversely, highly persistent policy induces the 
crowding in to exceed the crowding out, and aggregate investment will increase.
We establish these analytical results under fully flexible prices. In this setup, fiscal 
stimulus first operates through labour supply. Turning to nominal rigidities as in the 
DSGE literature would have two consequences. First, a markup-induced shift in labour 
demand would magnify the response of employment to a government spending shock. 
Second, when monetary policy only targets price stability and prices are rigid, the real 
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interest rate would no longer increase after this shock. The usual crowding effect would 
disappear in this case, strengthening the investment channel.
The literature has progressed for analytics of fiscal multipliers, but in (repeated) static 
models with constant capital (as in Hall 2009, Woodford 2011, Fève et al. 2013). The 
resulting multiplier only results from the intra-temporal allocations (the marginal rate 
of substitution between consumption and leisure, the marginal productivity of labour 
and the aggregate resources constraint), and ignores expectations about the timing 
of government policy. In our more general setup, we first connect this concept of a 
constant capital multiplier to one in which expectations and adjustment of investment 
matter. We notably obtain that ignoring the investment channel and expectations about 
the profile of the fiscal stimulus may lead to underestimation of the true multipliers, 
especially when the policy is very persistent (as we observe with actual data). 
Two thought experiments
We then enrich the analysis by considering two thought experiments. First, we 
single out the role of two key parameters of the model: how responsive (the growth 
of) consumption is to the real interest rate (the so-called intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution in consumption), and how sensitive hours worked are to the wage rate 
(the so-called Frisch elasticity of labour supply). The intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution in consumption only modifies the size of the constant capital multiplier, 
and does not alter the effects of the government spending driven by expectations. The 
elasticity of labour supply plays in two directions. First, when this elasticity is lower, 
the constant capital multiplier is smaller because the labour supply is less responsive 
after the negative income effect. Second, a lower elasticity of labour supply reduces the 
adjustment speed of consumption (for a given level of physical capital). This implies 
that the fiscal stimulus must persist for longer to ensure a positive response of saving.
In our second experiment, we consider the existence of hand-to-mouth consumers (as 
in Gali et al. 2007), that is, agents who simply consume their income every period, 
as is observed in the data. We interpret this fact as a consequence of imperfections in 
financial markets. With this new setup, our previous results are magnified. When the 
fraction of these households is large enough, aggregate consumption may increase after 
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a government spending shock. However, a positive response of consumption is neither 
necessary nor sufficient to obtain an output multiplier above unity.  
To see these results more precisely, Figure 1 represents the government spending 
multipliers of consumption, investment, and output for different combinations of 
fiscal stimulus persistence (ρ) and the share of hand-to-mouth consumers (λ). These 
multipliers are defined as the change in the corresponding variable – either consumption 
(∆c0), investment (∆x0), or output (∆y0) – relative to the change in government spending 
(∆g0) that originated the adjustment. 
The black line displays all (λ, ρ) pairs such that the impact output multiplier equals 
unity. Below this line output reacts less than government spending, while above the 
line output reacts more. The red and the blue lines correspond to combinations of (λ, ρ) 
where the multiplier is zero for consumption and investment, respectively. Below these 
lines, the corresponding variable responds negatively to a government spending shock, 
while above these lines the response is positive. We see how the impact multiplier 
depends on both parameters, because the share of non-savers, λ, affects the constant 
capital multiplier and the persistence of government spending, ρ, shapes the impact 
response of investment. In the upper-right part of this locus, the short-run output 
multiplier exceeds unity. Two areas are interesting. In the lower-right part of the 
figure (in green), larger-than-unity output multipliers are obtained through increases 
in investment despite negative consumption multipliers. In contrast, the purple zone 
in the upper-left part features an increase in consumption. Yet, the output multiplier is 
below unity due to the negative response of investment triggered by a low persistence 
of government spending. Our analysis shows that a positive consumption multiplier is 
neither necessary nor sufficient to achieve an output multiplier above unity.
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Our results have several implications for public policy.
First, they imply that short-lasting stimulus packages fail to stimulate one of the 
components of aggregate demand, namely, physical investment. It is interesting to note 
that for the estimated values of government spending persistence (i.e. the estimated 
first-order autoregressive coefficient), the response of investment is positive with our 
calibration. Hence, stimulus packages designed as increases in typical government 
spending should be preferred to specific, and shorter-lived, spending.
The second implication concerns the relevance of fiscal multipliers estimated using 
empirical approaches, such as structural vector autoregressions (SVARs). According 
to our results, structural models equipped to control for the persistence of the shock 
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deliver fiscal multiplier estimates which are useful for policy guidance (as in Leeper et 
al. 2011). Alternatively, assessing the effect of the persistence of government spending 
using natural and quasi-experimental identification strategies would constitute a fruitful 
avenue for future research.
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7 Reassessing tax policies and tax 
coordination: The case for a tax 
on automation
Pedro Teles
Catolica Lisbon School of Business & Economics, Banco de Portugal and CEPR
One of the fiscal challenges in Europe, as in the rest of the developed world, is how to 
deal with the social impact of widespread automation. How can we make sure that the 
benefits from innovation in automation and artificial intelligence are not confined to 
only a few? Automation threatens to destroy many of our jobs:; this may be a reason 
to tax robots, the intermediate goods that are associated with automation, and artificial 
intelligence. Both the impact of automation on the job market in Europe, and possible 
policy remedies, have been discussed in different forums (e.g. McKinsey&Company 
2017), and also in the European Parliament.1 
In a paper produced as part of the ADEMU project (Guerreiro et al. 2018), my co-
authors and I deal with precisely this issue. Who are the winners and losers from 
automation? And how can taxes be used to compensate the losers? 
A good principle of optimal taxation is that taxes should not distort production. This 
means that intermediate goods should not be taxed. Since robots are intermediate goods, 
they should not be taxed. No restrictions should be put on automation. 
But what if, as a result of automation, the jobs of a good part of the working population 
are destroyed on a large scale? What if we are not talking about just a few routine tasks 
or occupations, but rather all tasks that can possibly be automated? How can we prevent 
1 See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20170210IPR61808/robots-and-artificial-intelligence-meps-
call-for-eu-wide-liability-rules
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a large share of the population, instead of benefitting from progress, actually being 
made terribly poor?
 Why should we tax robots?
Bill Gates recently came up with some thought-provoking ideas on this, calling for a 
tax on robots.2 The European Parliament discussed such a tax a year ago and rejected it. 
As it turns out, Bill Gates is right – for the wrong reasons, but he is right. Robots should 
be taxed.
So, what are the right reasons to tax robots? As the costs of automation go down, robots 
inevitably (unless a robot tax is used) replace routine labour. It turns out that it is not 
that easy to change occupations. If you are routine, how do you become non-routine? If 
you are not empathic, and not very creative, how can you find a job that a robot won’t 
do better, and cheaper?  
These are the people that we should make sure get compensated for their bad luck 
in being born with the skills that a robot can imitate, whether a secretary or a brain 
surgeon. There may be quite a lot of us.
How can we make sure that everyone benefits from automation? How can the distribution 
be done efficiently? 
If we could tax different people differently, based on their type, then the problem, at 
least academically, would be easily solved. But we cannot. We can tax people based on 
their income, but not on their type. And that is a limited way to distribute. 
In a seminal paper, economists Peter Diamond and James Mirrlees showed that good 
policy does not tax intermediate goods as long as all net trades can be taxed at different 
rates (Diamond and Mirrlees 1971). Different types of labour supplied are different net 
trades and therefore, in the model, they can be taxed at different rates. In the real world, 
that’s tax discrimination, and the law typically does not allow for it.  Because different 
people cannot be taxed at different rates, taxing robots may be the way to go. A tax on 
2 See https://qz.com/911968/bill-gates-the-robot-that-takes-your-job-should-pay-taxes/
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robots is a tax on the non-routine, and a subsidy for the routine, and even if it distorts 
production, it should be part of the fiscal policy mix. 
In a different set up, in which the assumption of non-discriminatory taxation is justified 
by information constraints, good policy must make sure that the different types are 
happy with their allocated bundles. The tax on robots is used to make it easier to provide 
those incentives. 
 A tax system must ensure that the non-routine do in fact prefer to work hard, rather 
than earning the relatively low income of the routine, consequently paying less taxes, 
and working less. Raising the robot tax raises the pre-tax wage of the routine and lowers 
that of the non-routine, increasing the hours that the non-routine would have to work to 
earn the income of the routine. 
Robot taxes are used because they change relative prices. And relative prices can relax 
the relevant information constraints. 
How much should we tax robots?
So these are the reasons why taxing robots is a good idea. But how much should we tax? 
That depends on how restricted the tax system is. If the only restrictions are information 
constraints, the answer is, not much. In our numerical examples, the tax rate would be 
at most 10%. But if there are additional restrictions, the rate could get all the way up 
to almost 40%. 
If the tax system was restricted to be just like the one we have now, but more progressive, 
then despite the progressivity and high robot taxes, routine labour is still made relatively 
very poor by automation. 
There is a better way to redistribute. A system with progressive taxes but with a universal 
transfer substantially reduces the costs of redistributing. The universal transfer is the 
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unconditional basic income that has recently been discussed, and dismissed, in the 
European Parliament; interestingly, also in the context of the perils from automation.3
Should robot taxes be coordinated in Europe? In order to be effective, there should be 
coordination on such taxes. The reason is that the incentives to compete  over these 
taxes, in an attempt to reap the benefits of innovation in automation, are very strong. 
Related ADEMU studies
Work as part of ADEMU on reassessing tax policies and tax coordination covers 
many other issues. Kehoe and Pastorino (2016) argue that there is no need for a union-
level fiscal authority providing insurance against country-specific shocks if financial 
markets are well functioning.  Chari et al. (2017a) summarise some of their work on the 
formation of the Economic and Monetary Union and on the recent challenges that it has 
faced, arguing that the key mechanism is lack of commitment. Correia (2016) analyses 
the implications for efficiency and equity of lower capital taxes due to tax competition. 
Chari et al. (2017b) compute optimal coordinated policies and discuss how tax systems 
can be designed to allow for flexibility in the setting of taxes by the different countries, 
and also impose the good principles of free trade and no taxes on capital. Valued added 
taxes with border adjustment are designed to ensure free trade. Conversely, taxation of 
capital income is high in almost every European country, and the design is flawed. The 
US is far ahead in this respect, with the new cash flow tax with investment deductions. 
A tax on capital income with a full investment deduction taxes the initial capital without 
distorting capital accumulation.
Other ADEMU papers on optimal taxation of labour and capital are Abrahám and 
Carceles-Poveda (2016), Caballe and Dumitrescu (2016), Reis and Panousi  (2017), 
Kapička (2017), and Reis and Teles (2018).
3 The Committee on Legal Affairs of the European Parliament prepared a report stating that “in the light of the possible 
effects on the labour market of robotics and artificial intelligence a general basic income should be seriously considered”.
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8 Banking Union and the ECB
Hugo Rodriguez
Instituto de Análisis Económico (CSIC), MOVE and Barcelona GSE
Since the creation of the euro area, price stability has been the primary objective of 
the European System of Central Banks (ESCB),1 with the Eurosystem and the ECB, 
as its core institutions, being responsible for the implementation of monetary policy.2 
However, the recent financial and euro crises have highlighted a secondary mandate 
of the ESCB as one of the EU priorities, namely, the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions and the stability of the financial system.3 Accordingly, a new legislative 
wave has endowed the ECB with additional powers regarding banking supervision.4 
In addition, decisive steps have been taken in developing a new set of institutions, 
embedded in the European Banking Union, to contribute to the fulfilment of this second 
mandate. 
The relationship between the banking Union and the ECB is a key link in the Financial 
and Monetary Framework of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In this chapter, 
I briefly review some of the research being done under the ADEMU project related to: 
i) the weaknesses of the current Banking Union-ECB design and its implementation; 
ii) the new roles of the ECB, and iii) the possible conflicts between the ECB-Banking 
Union and the national central banks (NCBs) or the corresponding national competent 
authorities (NCAs).
1 See Article 127(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (2016/C 202/01) and Article 2 of the 
Statute of the ESCB and the European Central Bank (ECB) (2012/C 326/230).
2 See Petit (2017) for a discussion of the mandates of the ECB as well as other major central banks.
3 See Article 127(5) of the TFEU.
4 See Article 1 of the Single Supervisory Mechanism Regulation (2013/L 287/63).
The EMU after the Euro Crisis: Lessons and Possibilities
76
On the Banking Union-ECB design
The financial and euro crises made clear the close linkages between the banking sectors 
of the euro area member states and the high potential for contagion these linkages 
could create. These crises also highlighted the problems in the institutional design 
of the euro area associated with the tension between two opposite ideas. On the one 
hand, a currency area where a single monetary policy is combined with provisions for 
supervision and resolution of its banking sector managed at the country level could be 
ill designed. On the other hand, the integration of backstops and safety guards for the 
banking sector across the euro area could generate the wrong incentives and exacerbate 
free riding at the member state level. 
The creation of the European Banking Union (EBU) is supposed to provide the 
optimal solution to this tension between risk sharing and moral hazard within the EMU. 
To achieve that goal, the EBU is designed around three pillars.
The Single Resolution Mechanism
First, there is the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), which centralises the European 
response to banks facing difficulties. The SRM will make use of the Single Resolution 
Fund (SRF) financed through contributions by the banking sector. The spirit of the 
SRM is that, unless there are severe systemic disruptions to the banking system, bank 
resolutions will make use of this fund and, therefore, there will be no need for bailouts 
in which public funds are needed. However, Yiatrou (2016) provides a closer look at the 
design for the use and targets of the fund in these resolutions. She argues that the existing 
provisions might not deliver adequate funding for every given bank resolution. This 
state of affairs implies that the mechanism does not necessarily eliminate implicit 
government guarantees, which may have important consequences. First, it does not 
fully eliminate the connection between sovereigns and the banking sector. Second, 
it could fail to discipline banks’ risk-taking incentives. At the same time, Yiatrou 
recognises that implementing a fully credible regime would demand the channeling of 
a massive amount of funds which could significantly harm the profitability of banks. 
She concludes that the current setup seems to achieve a balance between its effects on 
risk-taking and the financial costs it imposes to banks.
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The Single Supervisory Mechanism
The second pillar is the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). This mechanism, 
granted to the ECB, has the role of monitoring the financial stability of banks. However, 
Monti and Petit (2016) question the legal basis of this mechanism. At a general level, 
these authors warn that existing Treaties do not include suitable provisions to empower 
the EU legislator with the capacity to create the elements of the EBU. Regarding 
the SSM in particular, the authors detect significant margins of discretion in the 
interpretation and implementation of supervisory standards both between the ECB and 
NCAs, and between the NCAs themselves.5 Other aspects that need a reformulation 
involve possible overlaps between the regulatory powers of the ECB and the European 
Banking Authority (EBA) as well as possible asymmetries between euro area and non-
euro area participants in the EBU.
Amtenbrink and Markakisŧ (2017) also highlight deficiencies in the design of the SSM. 
In particular, they point out the lack of clear criteria against which to assess the ECB’s 
performance in the area of banking supervision, as well as a gap in terms of the ability 
of the European Parliament to assign consequences to the ECB’s conduct. 
The European Deposit Insurance Scheme
The third pillar is the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), which is at a 
standstill – possibly due to fears of it becoming an across-countries transfer system and/
or exacerbating the inherent moral hazard problems. However, with the advent of the 
financial crisis, narrow banking has been proposed as another option to guarantee the 
value of deposits. This alternative has been heavily criticised as imposing unbearable 
costs on the banking industry. In Rodríguez Mendizábal (2016), I show how a 100% 
reserve requirement could be implemented in our current monetary system. At a 
general level, a necessary condition for this implementation not to impose a tax on banks 
has to do with the remuneration of required reserves at the same rate as the refinancing 
5 For example, the Five Presidents’ Report (Juncker et al. 2015) already recognised the need “to address the significant 
margin for discretion at the national level” regarding “the quality and composition of banks’ capital” and calls for the 
necessary legal amendments.
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operations of the central bank, a policy already followed by the Eurosystem. A second, 
and more stringent necessary condition is the disposal by banks of enough eligible 
collateral to pledge on these refinancing operations. Should this collateral constraint be 
overcome, the implementation of 100% reserve requirement would question the need to 
design a deposit guarantee scheme at the Banking Union level to prevent self-fulfilling 
bank runs.
On the new roles of the ECB
Within the Banking Union, the ECB plays three roles. The first one, already mentioned, 
is as guarantor of the SSM. Regarding this bank supervision role, Jungherr (2016) 
analyses the extent to which central banks should require commercial banks to reveal 
information to the public about their risk exposure. In this sense, starting in 2014, one 
of the key steps in the creation of the Banking Union was the ECB’s Asset Quality 
Review, which published an assessment of capital shortfalls for the 130 most significant 
euro area banks.6
The author seeks to identify the relevant trade-offs in the optimal choice of transparency 
and to provide arguments for its regulation. On the one hand, transparency is beneficial 
as it generates market discipline and allows banks to commit to a prudent portfolio 
choice, which takes into account the potential costs of instability. On the other hand, 
transparency increases the risk of being exposed as a weak bank in the midst of a 
sudden downturn. Opacity provides some insurance against this risk. In Jungherr’s 
model, mandatory public disclosure is socially beneficial in the presence of information 
spillovers between competing banks. Interestingly though, full disclosure maximises 
neither economic efficiency nor financial stability. Some degree of bank opacity is 
socially desirable.
6 Results of the Asset Quality Review since 2014 and of other supervisory measures can be found at https://www.
bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/tasks/comprehensive_assessment/html/index.en.html
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The second function of the ECB involves being the authority responsible for 
monetary stability – in particular as liquidity provider for the euro area, a role that, as 
Adao and Silva (2016) have shown, has been strengthened since the euro crisis with the 
observed increase in firms’ cash holdings.7 
The third role is as the authority responsible for financial stability, a mandate which, 
as mentioned above, has become very relevant, if not predominant, since the financial 
and euro crises. Following the steps of the Federal Reserve Board and the Bank of 
England, the ECB has actively pursued quantitative easing (QE) policies. However, it 
has not employed any credit easing policy such as the Term Asset-Backed Securities 
Loan Facility (TALF) implemented in 2009 by the Fed, which was a successful response 
to the freeze of the AAA-ABS market, and responsible for channelling a significant 
amount of funds for loans to households and small businesses. In fact, with TALF the 
Fed took a risk which needed to be backed up by the US Treasury, something unfeasible 
in the euro area. 
Gaballo and Marimon (2016) interpret the AAA-ABS freeze as a high-interest, high-
risk self-confirming equilibrium and show that a credit-easing policy that includes 
a subsidy contingent on lenders’ losses – such as TALF – is an optimal policy that 
dissipates (pessimistic) misbeliefs, even when the central bank has the same misbeliefs 
as private creditors. An interesting feature of such a policy is that it will reveal and 
implement a low-interest, low-risk rational expectation equilibrium at no cost for the 
fiscal authority since, in such a case, lenders would not realise losses and no subsidy 
will actually be given. Of course, if such a low-interest, low-risk equilibrium does not 
exist, then the policy will bear a cost. But this cost, the authors argue, will be finite, 
making the social expected value of such experimental policy likely to be positive.
7 See Thiele (2017) for an analysis of the degree of independence of the ECB within its role in implementing monetary 
policy in the euro area.   
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On the possibility of conflict with national authorities
The variety of roles played by the ECB within and outside the Banking Union multiplies 
the possibilities for conflict with its national counterparts, either with NCAs within the 
SSM or with national central banks within the Eurosystem. Smits (2017) reviews some 
of these possibilities. An important difference between the two main tasks assigned to 
the ECB – namely, monetary policy and prudential supervision – is the different degree 
of reviewability and scope for juridification. Whereas the legal acts produced by the 
ECB when conducting prudential supervision can potentially be challenged in court, 
this does not seem to be the case with respect to monetary policy decisions (with some 
exceptions). 
Regarding the sphere of monetary policy, the EMU design of decentralised 
implementation of centralised decision making may make the system prone to conflict 
between the ECB and the national central banks. Two such cases are gold and foreign 
reserves together with the Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA). First, while both 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the Statute of the 
ESCB and ECB make clear that gold and foreign reserves are held and managed by 
the Eurosystem, statements by NCBs and further agreements within the union seem 
to suggest that they remain a national competence. Second, the decentralisation of the 
ELA in favour of the NBCs seems in contradiction with the competences assigned 
exclusively to the ECB by European law.
Finally, another area of divergence between the ECB and its national counterparts 
rests on the diverse regimes of supervisory liability. While many national competent 
authorities explicitly limit supervisory liability to cases of intent or gross negligence, 
the ECB exhibits full liability pursuant to Article 340 of the TFEU, and therefore 
contradicts these national regimes. Thus, a clarification and precision of the liability 
regime of the ECB within the SSM seems of utmost importance to diminish the scope 
for future conflict.




Arguably, the most obvious risk associated with possible deficiencies in the design of 
the European Banking Union is the resurgence of a national bias and the fragmentation 
of financial markets across the EU. In fact, as reminded by Danièle Nouy, the current 
Chair of the Supervisory Board of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the recent 
financial crisis has plainly shown how fragile the apparent financial integration of the 
euro area was (Nouy 2015). As an example, Figure 1 presents a measure of financial 
fragmentation in the loan market in the euro area. It shows the dispersion in loan 
rates applied by credit institutions (also known as monetary financial institutions, or 
MFIs) to consumers across different countries in the euro area. We can see i) how 
this dispersion was present even before the financial crisis; ii) how it further increased 
with the beginning of the financial tensions in 2007; and, above all, iii) how it still 
remains at relatively high values more than ten years after the disruption in financial 
markets started. Similar conclusions can be drawn from certain measures of financial 
fragmentation also in money and bond markets (ECB 2017).
Figure 1 Cross-country standard deviation of MFI interest rates on consumer credit 
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This apparent high elasticity for fragmentation of the financial landscape of the euro 
area presents a serious challenge in the design of the Banking Union as the result of the 
tension mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. The ADEMU research summarised 
here reviews several areas where progress could be made. In particular:
• care should be taken in designing institutions (i.e. the SRM and SSM) to provide 
the right incentives both to market participants and states avoiding possible conflicts 
with national counterparts; and 
• possible new measures (i.e. narrow banking and credit easing policies) could 
contribute to alleviate financial tensions at zero or bearable costs. 
The aim would be to improve risk sharing and to ensure a level playing field for all 
actors involved without promoting free-riding or strengthening the banking-sovereign 
nexus.
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9 Financial stability: The role of 
macroprudential policies
Radim Boháček
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The belief held during the period of the Great Moderation that macroeconomic stability 
could be attained by monetary policy has been replaced by a growing consensus on the 
crucial role of macroprudential policies. The main goal of macroprudential policies 
is to promote financial stability by limiting excessive risks and vulnerabilities in the 
financial system. Macroprudential policies inherently represent a trade-off between 
efficiency and welfare losses ex ante in good times and the gains ex post should a crisis 
arise. Analysis of this trade-off has been the focus of research in the ADEMU project. 
As the Great Recession was largely caused by a collateral crisis in financial markets, 
macroprudential policies targeting excessive leverage have received most attention in the 
literature. Geanakoplos (2009) and Geanakoplos and Fostel (2012) show that collateral 
rates or leverage are more important to economic activity and asset prices than interest 
rates. During a leverage cycle there is too much leverage in normal times and therefore 
asset prices are too high, and vice versa in bad times. The loan-to-value ratio on new 
loans changes dramatically over time, and its rapid change is an important source of 
economic crises. The leverage cycle makes returns riskier, and creates an inefficient 
mix of skills and allocation of resources in the economy. Gehrig and Levinsky (2018) 
confirm these theoretical results in a laboratory experiment.
Possibly the best policy to prevent a collateral crisis is to act before it occurs. 
Restricting leverage in good times might be a policy that can achieve this end. Such 
restrictions are supposed to complement risk-based capital requirements as a simple 
regulation to mitigate cyclical fluctuations and to decrease the risk of contagion in 
the financial system documented by Adrian and Shin (2010) and Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen (2009). Boháček (2017) derives endogenous leverage bounds arising from 
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adverse selection and moral hazard between borrowers and lenders in an environment 
with imperfect monitoring and default. Incentive compatible allocations are mapped 
into restrictions on margins for collateralised loans. These margins are used to simulate 
the macroprudential policies trade-off: in good times, restricting leverage is costly as 
it limits the efficient allocation of resources to their most productive use; on the other 
hand, accumulation of assets prevents excessive deleveraging during a recession or 
after a change in regulatory framework. Numerical simulations show that the efficiency 
costs are less than ½ percent of total output in the good state, while the gains are more 
than 8% during a simulated financial crisis.
Bianchi (2011) documents that over-borrowing externalities have a large quantitative 
impact on welfare. When agents fail to internalise the price effects of their borrowing 
decisions, collateral credit constraints in nontradable goods can induce sharp and 
sudden adjustments in access to foreign financing. When agents have accumulated a 
large amount of debt and a typical adverse shock hits, the economy suffers the typical 
dislocation associated with an emerging market crisis. This pecuniary externality can 
be corrected by reducing the amount of borrowing ex ante, either by a tax on debt or 
margin restrictions. Macroprudential policies (a simple tax on debt) imposed before a 
crisis can increase the amount of precautionary savings and reduce the incidence and 
severity of the crisis when it occurs. 
Korinek and Simsek (2016) model the aggregate demand externality of excessive 
leverage. It is desirable to slow down the accumulation of leverage because borrowers 
who individually behave rationally undertake excessive leverage from a social point 
of view. Agents do not take into account general equilibrium effects. Greater ex ante 
leverage leads to a greater ex post reduction in aggregate demand and a deeper recession. 
This is because deleveraging transfers liquid wealth from borrowers to lenders when the 
former have a much higher marginal propensity to consume. A macroprudential policy 
restricting leverage could make all agents better off. Korinek and Simsek also show 
that when debt is collateralised by financial assets, a fire-sale externality exacerbates 
aggregate demand externalities, leading to a more severe deleveraging episode and a 
deeper recession. 
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To prevent episodes with household deleveraging and a subsequent liquidity trap, Farhi 
and Werning (2016) emphasise ex ante macroprudential restrictions on borrowing 
during the credit boom in order to alleviate the severity of the future crisis in the form 
of loan-to-value or debt-to-income ratios. In a currency union where monetary policy 
is constrained by a fixed exchange rate, capital controls can be used to smooth the 
business cycle. Similarly, when agents are subject to collateral constraints that depend 
on the terms of trade, taxes on capital inflows might be imposed in anticipation of 
binding collateral constraints. The authors offer a general theory for macroprudential 
policies based on nominal rigidities and constraints on monetary policy (the zero lower 
bound or a fixed exchange rate in a currency union). Instead of pecuniary externalities, 
their theory emphasises aggregate demand externalities. The optimal Pigouvian taxes 
provide incentives for agents to reallocate their wealth to states with higher marginal 
propensities to spend. 
Unconventional policies might be required to alleviate the effects of the financial crisis. 
Gaballo and Marimon (2016) propose credit easing by targeted subsidies in a new 
theory of self-confirming equilibria. For monetary policy constrained at the zero bound, 
Molteni (2017) suggests an unconventional policy of swapping illiquid government 
bonds for highly liquid papers (short-term debt or money). 
Direct purchases or collateralised loans might be necessary for a successful alleviation 
of contractionary effects of a liquidity shock. In an international setting, Molteni (2017) 
focuses on the role of funding liquidity – the ease with which investors can obtain 
funding against a collateral. Government bonds are the prime collateral securities in the 
European repo market, an essential source of funding for the banking system. During 
the financial crisis, the increase in counterparty credit risk led to a shift to secured 
funding backed by collateral. The resulting deleveraging channel had quantitatively 
large, negative effects on aggregate output and price levels. Rodriguez-Lopez (2018) 
studies how cross-country differences in asset liquidity affect the international 
allocation of economic activity. The model generates positive spillovers of the market 
for liquidity on the size and productivity of the sector that generates liquid assets. 
Similar to precautionary savings in a Bewley model, agents over-accumulate assets due 
to the liquidity services they might provide should potential opportunities to trade in 
the financial market occur.
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Seoane and Yurdagul (2018) model small open economies subject to collateral 
constraints with endogenous borrowing limits. They study the role of demand shocks to 
international lending in a model where the collateral constraint depends on the tradable 
value of domestic income. They find procyclical optimal macroprudential capital 
controls (tax on foreign debt), similar to Fernández et al.’s (2015) capital controls that 
alleviate over-borrowing cycles.
The design of effective macroprudential policies might require international cooperation. 
Fornaro and Romei (2018) study countercyclical macroprudential policies that limit 
debt accumulation during booms to sustain aggregate demand and employment during 
liquidity traps triggered by deleveraging episodes. They show that these policies, while 
effective from the perspective of individual countries, might backfire if applied on a 
global scale. The reason is that prudential policies implemented by booming countries 
generate a rise in the global supply of savings or, equivalently, a fall in global aggregate 
demand, which exacerbates the recession in countries currently in a liquidity trap. A 
paradox of global thrift might arise because national governments do not internalise the 
impact of their actions on other countries.
Several papers in the ADEMU project analyse the effects of monetary policy during and 
after the Great Recession. Hedlund (2018) studies the effects of explicitly inflating away 
mortgage debt in a model of endogenously illiquid housing market with default. The 
generated inflation can boost house prices, reduce foreclosure activity, and accelerate 
the macroeconomic recovery. However, except for the case of fixed rate mortgages, 
the various inflationary channels cancel out and the overall effect is weak. Cui and 
Radde (2017) develop a monetary model with a search theory of asset market liquidity 
and endogenous financing constraints. As money relaxes financing constraints, private 
assets must pay an endogenous liquidity premium that rises with financing constraints. 
Shocks to the intermediation costs are essential to jointly capture the countercyclical 
liquidity premium, procyclical and volatile asset prices, and large fluctuations of 
macroeconomic variables as observed in the data.
The ADEMU project has shown that designing the optimal macroprudential policies is 
a demanding theoretical exercise based on important insights in market externalities. 
In economies with incomplete asset markets and credit constraints, a redistribution 
of asset holdings induces relative price changes in spot markets. These relative price 
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changes represent a pecuniary externality that is not internalised by otherwise rational 
private agents. Such inefficient equilibria can be improved by macroprudential policies 
in the form of taxes or restrictions on allocations. At the same time, it is important to 
study macroprudential policies as a trade-off between the ex ante losses in efficiency 
and welfare and the ex post gains during a crisis. The costs can be large as severe 
financial crises with deleveraging episodes are rare and highly uncertain events. 
Second, while often welfare-improving, simplified policy tools might have costly side 
effects. Macroprudential policies constrain efficient allocations and might limit not 
only excessive risk-taking but also innovations. For example, a simple interest rate 
policy that promotes a precautionary accumulation of collateral also affects agents 
whose allocations are efficient. A leverage regulation disadvantages borrowers with low 
savings and might actually push some of them towards alternative and riskier sources of 
borrowing (credit cards, unsecured loans, etc.). A higher interest rate might slow down 
economic growth and even generate a recession. These complex effects of optimal 
stabilisation policies illustrate the importance of the contribution that ADEMU research 
makes to the new macro-finance literature and to our understanding of macroprudential 
policies and their role in financial markets.
References
Adrian, T and H S Shin (2010), “Liquidity and leverage”, Journal of Financial 
Intermediation 19(3): 418-437.
Bianchi, J (2011), “Overborrowing and Systemic Externalities in the Business Cycle”, 
American Economic Review 101(7): 3400–3426.
Boháček, R (2017), “Leverage Bounds with Asymmetric Information and Default”, 
ADEMU Working Paper No. 2017/060.
Brunnermeier, M and L H Pedersen (2009), “Market liquidity and funding liquidity”, 
Review of Financial Studies 22(6): 2201-2238.
Cui, W and S Radde (2017), “Search-Based Endogenous Asset Liquidity and the 
Macroeconomy”, ADEMU Working Paper No. 2017/061.
The EMU after the Euro Crisis: Lessons and Possibilities
90
Farhi, E and I Werning (2016), “A Theory of Macroprudential Policies in the Presence 
of Nominal Rigidities”, Econometrica 84: 1645–1704. 
Fernández, A, A Rebucci, and M Uribe (2015), “Are capital controls countercyclical?”, 
Journal of Monetary Economics 76: 1-14.
Fornaro, L and F Romei (2018), “The Paradox of Global Thrift”, ADEMU Working 
Paper No. 2018/99. 
Gaballo, G and R Marimon (2016), “Breaking the Spell with Credit-Easing”, ADEMU 
Working Paper No. 2016/001.
Geanakoplos, J (2009), “The leverage cycle”, NBER Macroeconomic Annual 24: 1-65.
Geanakoplos, J and A Fostel (2012), “Why does bad news increase volatility and 
decrease leverage?”, Journal of Economic Theory 147: 501-525.
Gehrig, T P and R Levinsky (2018), “On the asset prices and leverage requirements: An 
experimental analysis”, ADEMU Working Paper No. 2018/100.
Hedlund, A (2018), “Failure to Launch: Housing, Debt Overhang, and the Inflation 
Option”, ADEMU Working Paper No. 2018/98.
Korinek, A and A Simsek (2016), “Liquidity Trap and Excessive Leverage”, American 
Economic Review 106: 699-738.
Molteni, F (2017), “Liquidity, Government Bonds and Sovereign Debt Crises”, 
ADEMU Working Paper No. 2017/072.
Rodriguez-Lopez, A (2016), “Liquidity and International Trade”, CESifo Working 
Paper Series 6286
Seoane, H D and E Yurdagul (2018), “On Overborrowing: Trend Shocks and Capital 
Controls”, ADEMU Working Paper No. 2018/97.




Radim Boháček is a Senior Researcher at CERGE at the Charles University and the 
Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences. He holds a PhD in Economics 
from the University of Chicago. He serves as a country team leader for the Survey 
of Health, Retirement, and Ageing in Europe (SHARE ERIC) in the Czech Republic. 
His research interests include general equilibrium models with heterogeneous agents, 
dynamic macroeconomic policy, and optimal government policies. He has published 
in journals such as the Journal of Monetary Economics, the Economic Journal, the 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, and the Journal of Macroeconomics.

93
10 The European Stability 
Mechanism: The path to reform
Giorgio Monti
European University Institute
While the European Stability Mechanism can be credited for having played a vital role 
in safeguarding the financial stability of the euro area and of its member states, thus 
discharging its mandate (Article 12(1) ESM Treaty), its design and operation have not 
escaped criticism: 
• first, as an international treaty it lacks the usual accountability channels found in EU 
law, for example bypassing the European Parliament; 
• second, the conditions attached to its loans attracted criticism for harming 
fundamental rights of EU nationals and eroding national democracies; 
• third its governance structure gave large member states blocking votes, causing 
resentment about its operation; 
• finally, the linkage with the IMF caused some friction with the EU institutions.
Post-crisis, how should the ESM be redesigned to ensure continued stability for the 
euro area? In this chapter, I start by contrasting two ambitious positions on the design 
of the European Stability Fund (ESF) that emerge from the member states. I then 
contrast these with the timid institutional proposals of the Commission and close by 
suggesting that retaining the ESM as an international treaty allows for a quicker process 
for achieving meaningful reforms.
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Divergent national preferences
The two member states at the heart of European integration appear to have different views 
on the role of a European Stability Fund (Financial Times 2017). A ‘German’ vision for 
the ESF entails giving it greater power over member states: overseeing compliance with 
the fiscal compact and monitoring the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
Its technocratic design would replace the politicisation of the Quadriga (the decision-
making group involving four institutions - the ESM, the IMF, the Commission, and 
the ECB) for countries receiving loans and the ineffective supervision of member 
states by the EU institutions. Successive enhancements of EU-level economic policy 
coordination have failed to prevent member states making poor policy choices (Leino 
and Saarenheimo 2016), but one has to wonder whether simply passing the task to 
another agency resolves the difficulty of enforcing rules on sovereign states when the 
policy choices at stake are so central to what a state does.
Perhaps an alternative would be to offer positive incentives for states to undertake 
important economic reforms (discussed by Steinbach 2016), or simply to place more 
hope in the softer forms of governance (for example, the review of national budgets) 
serving as a way for the EU to learn more about national priorities and engage in a 
constructive dialogue with states (Klipatrick 2016 suggests this possible reading). 
Substantively, the ESF would be able to engage in debt restructuring. This would 
complete the process begun with the introduction of Collective Action Clauses, 
required by the ESM Treaty (Martinelli 2016).  Moreover, the ESF would serve as a 
fiscal backstop to the Single Resolution Framework.  
In contrast, a ‘French’ vision aligns the ESF with the mandate of the IMF, whose role 
is “to give confidence to members” by providing them with resources so that the states 
do not have to “resort to measures destructive of national or international prosperity” 
(IMF Treaty, Article 1(v)). In this vision, funds would arrive before a crisis happens, to 
pay for structural reforms or to facilitate investment spending.
While it is hardly conceivable that either of these approaches would be embraced, they 
reveal a continued division on the causes of the crisis and on the best policy response: 
the German vision rests on better discipline ex ante, the French vision believes that 
solidarity among member states requires a means by which assistance can be afforded 
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to those states that need it. More technically, it is hard to see how these two proposals 
could be implemented within EU law absent a revision of the Treaties, which is not on 
the horizon. They remain, however, markers of what kinds of cures the euro area ideally 
needs to render it sustainable.
The Commission’s proposal
The Commission’s opening gambit is to opt for an institutional reconfiguration. The 
major move is to integrate most of the ESM Treaty into the EU Treaties. The renamed 
European Monetary Fund (EMF) would largely function as the ESM does now, only 
under EU law and not as an international organisation.
This raises two legal questions. 
• The first is how far the Treaty provides a sound legal basis for the ESF. The 
Commission relies on the provision that confers competence to legislate should 
this prove necessary to attain the Treaty’s objectives (Article 352 Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU), but one might wonder, given that the ESM has served its 
purpose so far, whether it is necessary to integrate the ESF into EU law, in particular 
since no new tasks appear to be assigned to it which could only be achieved within 
the framework of EU law. 
• The second is what sort of “unique legal entity” (European Commission 2017: 5) the 
ESF would be under EU law. This issue becomes more pertinent when we consider 
how the ESF would operate: if a member state requests stability support, the EMF’s 
decisions to grant it and its approval of the Memorandum of Understanding are both 
subject to the Council’s approval. In all but name, this turns the EMF into an agency, 
providing its advice to other EU institutions. 
We should welcome the more innovative substantive reforms: extending the EMF 
to provide a fiscal backstop, and the commitment to carrying out a social impact 
assessment of the Memorandum of Understanding. Some might want to see a stronger 
footing for protecting social rights (Kilpatrick 2016). However, these important reforms 
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could be achieved by reforming the ESM Treaty. Moreover, it does not appear that the 
reform of the voting rules (80% as opposed to unanimity) will do much to accelerate 
decision-making or remove the power of the larger states.
How best to move forward?
The main problem with the Commission’s existing proposal is that it is not clear that 
the reforms proposed are necessary – reforming the ESM Treaty could provide similar 
outcomes. Its lending policies have been controversial but also largely successful, 
and there are lessons to be learned which can be integrated within a reform of the 
Treaty (for an initial assessment, see Corsetti et al. 2017). Indeed, an internal and 
an external review recommended a number of modifications to enhance the ESM’s 
legitimacy, and many of these adjustments are doable without major architectural 
reform (Transparency International 2017, Tumpel-Gugerell 2017), such as improving 
the ESM’s governance and transparency and enhancing the legitimacy of the conditions 
set for member states receiving funds. This would appear an easier pathway that can 
achieve the same objectives as the Commission’s proposal with less fuss, thus creating 
a more effective emergency mechanism.  Deepening the ESM’s risk-sharing function 
would be welcome but, as noted, one has to address the division among member states 
and the not insignificant factor that this probably requires amending the EU Treaties, a 
risky process given the political fragility of the EU today.
References
Corsetti, G, Aa Erce and T Uy (2017), “Official Sector Lending Strategies During the 
Euro Area Crisis”, ADEMU Working Paper No. 2017/70.
European Commission (2017), “Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment 
of the European Monetary Fund”, COM(2017) 827 final.
Financial Times (2017), “The painful grind to a stronger Eurozone”, 19 November. 
Kilpatrick, C (2016), “The new economic component of EMU: a lawful and effective 
design?”, ADEMU Working Paper No. 2016/007.
The European Stability Mechanism: The path to reform
Giorgio Monti
97
Leino, P and T Saarenheimo(2016), “On the Limits of Economic Policy Coordination”, 
ADEMU Working Paper No. WP 2016/36.
Martinelli, T (2016), “Euro CAC and the existing rules on sovereign debt restructuring 
in the Euro area: an appraisal four years after the Greek debt swap”, ADEMU Working 
Paper No. WP 2016/043.
Steinbach, A (2016), ‘”The Structural Reforms in EU Member States: Exploring 
Sanction-Based Mechanisms”, ADEMU Working Paper No. WP 2016/45.
Transparency International (2017), From crisis to stability: How to make the ESM 
transparent and accountable.
Tumpel-Gugerell, G (2017), EFSF/ESM Financial Assistance: Evaluation Report, 
European Stability Mechanism.
About the author
Giorgio Monti joined the EUI in 2010, where he holds a Joint Chair in Competition 
Law, and is presently Head of Department. He writes on all aspects of competition law, 
with a particular interest in the aims pursued by antitrust enforcement; his book EC 
Competition Law (2007, second edition in preparation) places antitrust enforcement in 
its economic, institutional and policy context to explain how the law evolves. He has 
taught competition law at all levels, from undergraduates to industry professionals and 
also to judges and civil servants. He is a non-governmental adviser to the International 




11 The political economy of policy 
implementation
David K. Levine and Andrea Mattozzi
European University Institute
As we have seen during the Greek crisis, for example, the Economic and Monetary 
Union is heavily influenced by political concerns and issues. Tools for studying the 
impact of political concerns on the EMU are inadequate.1 The work of ADEMU in 
the area of political economy has been to develop the theory needed to deal with these 
issues. In this chapter, we lay out some of the main concerns and questions and indicate 
how ADEMU’s political economy research has created a framework for addressing 
them. We focus on rent seeking in the banking sector.
Rent seeking in the banking sector 
To understand the political economy of monetary policy and monetary unions, it is 
necessary to take a step back and examine how modern monetary systems create 
opportunities for rent-seeking in both the public and private sectors. Governments 
maintain substantial monopoly power over money. To enhance this power, governments 
interfere in borrowing and lending markets in a variety of ways, ranging from issuing 
taxpayer-backed debt to imposing controls over the issuance of securities of virtually 
every type. There are positive reasons for the role of government – concerns over market 
stability (fighting recession, lender of last resort) and raising government revenue (the 
inflation tax). There are also negative reasons – monopoly and the regulation associated 
with it creates opportunities for government officials to seek rents. 
1 Katsimi and Moutos (2010) document the political dimensions – notable also in their paper is the absence of theoretical 
analysis.
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Much of the monopoly power in the monetary sector is decentralised in private banking. 
The banking sector is regulated by requiring banks to hold government licenses and to 
abide by a variety of government regulations concerning the types of economic activities 
allowed and the structure of investment portfolios permitted. This regulation both 
limits and enhances opportunities for private-sector and public-sector rent seeking. The 
primary regulatory agency charged with overseeing these controls is the central bank. 
To reduce public-sector rent seeking, central banks are supposed to be ‘independent’ 
of direct political control. There is a large literature in economics on the importance of 
central bank independence from politics. As has become clear, unfortunately, central 
banks are far from independent from private-sector rent seeking. In case the problem 
of appointing bankers to head central banks is not clear, a salutary story from the US 
may clarify the impact of private bank rent seeking on central banks. On 16 September 
2008 the US central bank – under pressure from the Secretary of the Treasury, a former 
CEO of Goldman Sachs – bailed out the insurance group AIG. It later emerged that 
the primary purpose of this bailout was to save the creditors of AIG – most important 
among them, Goldman Sachs.
The banking sector has been extremely innovative in defeating measures designed to 
combat rent seeking and this poses a problem both to taxpayers who get to pay the 
bills and to the stability of the system. Bankers construct high leverage portfolios that 
give high immediate returns with a small risk of catastrophic failure. The high return is 
pocketed in part by bankers in the form of high salaries and bonuses and in a variety of 
political payoffs, ranging from subsidised financing for political parties and politicians, 
to high-paying, undemanding jobs for retired government officials. Unfortunately, when 
the catastrophic failure occurs, the cost is largely borne by taxpayers. Investors have 
a somewhat intermediate position – they also wish to profit from public subsidies, but 
hope to pocket the money themselves and not have it go into the pocket of the bankers.
Regulatory capture and collusive groups 
The heart of the political problem in banking is the capture of regulatory institutions – 
those charged with supervising the monetary institutions are suborned by the institutions 
they are supposed to regulate. 
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The problem of corruption is well recognised and has given rise to a number of populist 
political movements, including Podemos in Spain and Cinque Stelle in Italy. The 
policies proposed by these movements – withdrawal from the monetary union, public 
policy set by referendum – are unlikely to have much impact.  This leaves open the 
question of what policies are likely to work and whether the popular discontent in these 
political movements can be harnessed to improve matters.  
To get to grips with what might be feasible, we start by observing that public officials 
and politicians do not operate in isolation. While individual banks can be influential 
with regulators and governments and can suborn the system in a variety of ways, there 
are many banks and it is bankers collectively who pose the greatest threat to both 
taxpayers and system stability. Bankers can and do collude in their efforts, yet each has 
an incentive to let the other bankers do the work. And so it is with public officials, few 
of whom are individually influential, but who as a group wield great power. 
Our primary emphasis was on developing tools to study the internal incentives of 
collusive groups such as bankers, public officials and political parties. This strong 
theoretical understanding is leading to an empirical understanding of how these groups 
operate and how they compete with one another. Ultimately, this will make it possible 
to design institutions which mitigate the harm and enhance the good that these groups 
do. 
Disrupting versus enhancing collusion 
Collusive groups endogenously generate and enforce social norms that achieve group 
objectives. There are two sides of this coin. On the one hand, if groups such as bankers 
or public officials are engaged in rent seeking, disrupting their ability to collude – for 
example, through policies that make it more difficult to monitor each other – can reduce 
undesirable behaviour. On the other hand, groups can design positive incentives as well 
as negative incentives. This means that if threats against the group as a whole cause 
them to change their objectives, then it is desirable to enhance rather than inhibit their 
ability to collude.
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A case in point is the EU rule that prohibits tax-financed subsidies of particular industries, 
banking in particular. This has been used to prevent members state governments from 
bailing out banks. An Italian response to this rule is of interest – the Atlante initiative 
taxed successful banks to pay for failing banks. It is unclear whether this is a genuine 
initiative or simply a legal cover for government subsidisation (for example, by 
implicitly or explicitly promising the successful banks future government favour in 
exchange for short-term funding). If the initiative was real, then on the face it is a 
nonsensical – the malincentives of taxing the winners to pay the losers should be self-
evident. If we view this through the lens of collusive lobbying, however, the issue is less 
clear-cut. The successful banks are ‘guilty’ of something – they are guilty of lobbying 
efforts that made it possible for large-scale banking failures. If banks believe that in the 
future they will collectively be responsible for failing banks, then they have incentive to 
lobby for regulation – such as increased leverage requirements – that reduces the ability 
of their competitors to drag them under.
This is one example of how changing group incentives can act to subvert subversion. 
There are broader threats that could be effective as well. For example, if populist 
movements such as Podemos or Cinque Stelle were to push for a periodic audit of 
taxpayer money used to subsidise the banking sector with the threat of criminal penalties 
against public and private officials in response to a failed audit, these officials and 
bankers would have an incentive to collude to promote good rather than bad behaviour. 
The policy of jailing bankers and officials in response to banking crises has been used 
with substantial success in a number of countries such as Chile. 
Economic theory at this point does not provide good answers about how collusive 
organisations operate. The heart of our work has been to address the issue of collusive 
groups – bankers, government officials, political parties and other collective entities – to 
see what sort of policies and regulations are likely to succeed in the face of rent seeking. 
We are developing theoretical tools and beginning the process of applying them to 
practical problems.2 Among our tentative initial findings is the idea that increasing the 
2 Theoretical tools are developed in Dutta et al. (2016) examining the nature of equilibrium between self-organising 
groups and Levine and Modica (2015) studying the nature of incentives and enforcement schemes that may be used by 
self-organizing groups.
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cost of lobbying favours special interests, while decreasing the cost of lobbying levels 
the playing field between special interests and broad general interests.3 With reference 
specifically to the EMU, a substantial amount of independence of central banks from 
the political process has been achieved through institutional design. It seems that 
independence from the banking sector could be improved, for example by restricting 
the appointment of former bankers to central bank positions and by strong prohibitions 
on former officials joining banks. 
Conclusions
There is a broad picture of political contests emerging from our work. The relative 
influence of large and small groups depends to a key extent on whether participation 
by individuals is a chore (meaning that there is a fixed cost of participating) or a 
duty (meaning that there is a benefit to the individual of at least a modest level of 
participation).4 We generally think of lobbying as a chore and voting as a duty – but 
this need not be the case. For example, if we could establish as a social norm that active 
participation in lobbying of public officials is a civic duty, this would shift advantage 
away from smaller, special interest groups towards larger, common interest groups. 
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In December 2012, almost in the midst  of the euro crisis, Herman. Van Rompuy, in 
collaboration with three other presidents of the EU, traced out a roadmap “Towards 
a genuine Economic and Monetary Union” (Van Rompuy et al. 2012), which was 
then followed by the Five Presidents’ Report in June 2015 (Juncker et al. 2015), and 
subsequently further discussed and developed by the European Commission (2017a, 
2017b, 2017c). This chapter provides a short (personal) assessment of this roadmap, 
mostly based on the experience of these years and the research of the Horizon 2020 
ADEMU project, which started with this aim in June 2015. It concludes with a proposal 
to strengthen the Economic and Fiscal Union (see Chapter 2 of this eBook).
According to the roadmap, Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union is, and will 
continue to be, formed by three unions: the Monetary Union, the Economic and 
Fiscal Union, and the Financial Union. The Financial Union, in turn, encompasses the 
Banking Union and the Capital Markets Union. The pursuit of growth and stability, 
beyond what member countries can achieve on their own, is the raison d’être of the 
EMU. This defines a goal for each of the three unions: the pursuit of price stability, 
economic stability and financial stability, respectively.
The reason the EMU can do better than the sum of its parts is based on its potential 
capacity to i) avoid inefficient fragmentations (e.g. of currencies, economic regulations, 
and financial markets, respectively, for the unions; ii) endogenise externalities within 
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the single market (e.g. competitive devaluations, fiscal dumping and social spillovers, 
and financial contagion, respectively); and iii) confront time-inconsistency problems.1 
The latter is especially relevant to our discussion.
EMU – originally a monetary union -- emerged not as the design of an ‘optimal 
currency area’, but to solve the time-inconsistency problem of monetary policy: the 
temptation to disrupt price stability ex post by generating inflation episodes (and 
competitive devaluations) (Chari et al. 2016, 2017). The Financial Union has its own 
time-inconsistency problems to confront: the temptation to bailout ‘locally too big to 
fail’ firms and banks, and to transform private liabilities into public liabilities (and also 
to avoid domestic sovereign debt problems becoming a burden on domestic private 
investors). Similarly, the Economic and Fiscal Union has a major time-inconsistency to 
confront: the temptation not to follow proper counter-cyclical policies in good times, 
and the inability to do so in bad times without incurring ‘excessive’ debts.
In fact, time-inconsistency problems also imply that it may not be easy to draw the lines 
between the three unions. In other words, even if a union policy might be more credible 
than a state policy, if it doesn’t succeed in solving its time-inconsistency problems, 
these will spill over into the other unions. In particular, if the Financial Union does 
not break the link between private and public financial liabilities, the Fiscal and/or the 
Monetary Union will need to take care of them. Similarly, insufficient counter-cyclical 
fiscal policies can result in excessive debts becoming a burden to monetary stability 
(and in debt crises, if the monetary authority sticks to its mandate).
Furthermore, a time-inconsistency problem arises even within the fiscal union of 
a federal state. Political scientists refer to ‘Hamilton’s Paradox’ (Rodden 2006),2 
according to which “the problem of federations may not be so much that the federal 
level is weak but that it is not credibly weak. Hence, it is taken for a free ride by lower-
tier governments, forcing the federal government’s hand to bail them out with central 
resources” (Schelkle 2016). 
1 There are additional advantages, such as improving (or minimising the loss of) the competitive advantage of the EU in 
the global economy
2 See also Sargent (2012).
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The list of concerns is not complete without accounting for some negative side effects 
which union may entail, such as: i) the major exposure of global shocks (financial, 
migration, etc.), ii) the minor capacity to react to local shocks (i.e. with a common 
currency and strict fiscal restrictions), and iii) exacerbating moral hazard problems (e.g. 
excessive borrowing or risk-taking, lessening the responsibility of national politicians). 
In the original design of the Economic and Monetary Union there was almost no 
reference to the fiscal and financial unions, as if it were enough to set debt and deficit 
constraints (what became first the Maastricht euro entry conditions, and later the 
Stability and Growth Pact) and a ‘no bailout of  sovereign debts’ clause in the Treaties 
to draw the dividing lines with ‘the other unions’ and not cross them. Possibly to make 
the euro politically feasible, the list of concerns was short.
The euro crisis has been a major ‘stress test’ for the EMU – internal European fault 
lines have been opened up by an external financial crisis, the lines across the EMU 
unions have been crossed, and the Economic and Fiscal Union has been shown to not 
be immune to Hamilton’s Paradox. As mentioned above, the EU presidents’ roadmap 
extended the EMU design to cover the three unions, and progress along the roadmap 
route has been made in recent years. Is it enough to avoid further undesired ‘stress 
tests’? If not, would the completion of the roadmap be enough? Or, alternatively, are 
there reasons why the roadmap will not, or should not, even be completed? If so, how 
should we proceed? But before addressing these questions, it is helpful to note that the 
above strengths, or potential capacities, and problems – particularly of credibility – are 
also present in advanced federal states.
Not surprisingly, versions of the three EMU unions, with their institutions, also reflect 
the fiscal, monetary and financial frameworks of developed countries, such as the 
US. In fact, the more mature Monetary Union and the infant Financial Union share 
many similarities with similar unions elsewhere. The ECB, as the core institution of 
the Monetary Union, is an improved design of central bank independence, and it has 
succeeded during the recent crises not only in maintaining its mandate of price stability 
(actually, with periods below the target, which has not helped indebted countries ), but 
also in allowing positive spillovers into the other two unions. It provided the Financial 
Union with much-needed liquidity in the euro area banking sector, and took on board 
the Single Supervisory Mechanism, while maintaining the dividing line with the 
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Monetary Union. It aided the Economic and Fiscal Union by defusing the euro debt 
crisis in the Summer of 2012, promising “whatever it takes” to save the euro, and it took 
on (selected) debts of ‘stressed countries’. In sum, the ECB has emerged from the euro 
crisis as the strongest – and possibly most trusted – EMU institution.3
The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the (more idiosyncratic) Single Resolution 
Mechanism (SRM) and the planned European Deposit Insurance Scheme, together with 
Basel regulations, are complementary mechanisms and regulations aimed at balancing 
financial development and stability; their strengths and weaknesses are not qualitatively 
different from similar institutions and regulations in developed countries, except in 
their degree of (political) complexity and incompleteness.4 For example, in contrast 
to the ECB, political accountability of the SRM is not exercised at ‘arm’s length’ but 
rather ‘hands on’, in single bank resolutions over a weekend. Incompleteness means 
that the SRM is still short of guaranteeing the dividing line between private and public 
liabilities, or that a deposit in euros is worth the same no matter where the bank is within 
the EMU. According to the current version of the roadmap, this will not only require 
backup by the private banking sector but also the existence of a ‘fiscal backstop’, i.e. 
relying on the Economic and Fiscal Union! The Banking Union is still in its infancy 
(even more so is the Capital Markets Union, although it should require less institutional 
development) and, therefore, it is too early to say whether the limitations already 
detected will be overcome with experience or will become obstacles to fulfilling the 
Financial Union objectives.
However, it is the Economic and Fiscal Union which is remarkably different from its 
corresponding unions in advanced economies and federal states. The roadmap sets out 
some steps that would make it more similar, but even on completion of the roadmap, it 
would nevertheless remain very different (not that homogeneity with federal states such 
as the US should be the goal). The EU is not a federal state: “I am a citizen of the EU 
3 Even Eurosceptic parties – such as Cinque Stelle and La Lega in Italy – have refrained from criticising the ECB when 
they have become winning political parties in a major euro area country. 
4 See Chapter 8 in this eBook, and the ADEMU Working Papers referenced therein, for a more detailed assessment of the 
European Banking Union. In particular, note that the author’s vindication of a ‘narrow banking design’ also applies to 
other developed nation banking systems (Rodriguez Mendizabal 2016).
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because I am a citizen of an EU member country; similarly, I am a citizen of the euro 
area because I am a citizen of a euro area country”. Beyond this fundamental difference, 
stressing the role of the states in the EU, there are differences that set the Economic and 
Fiscal Union apart – in particular, there are no EU (or euro area) taxes or debts, and the 
EU budget as a share of GDP  is minimal (the euro area budget being nil), while in the 
member states it is not. Furthermore, there is no treasury or formal fiscal authority that 
coordinates, links, or simply ‘talks with’ the ECB, except for the ‘informal’ ECOFIN 
and euro area Council . The roadmap is supposed to take care of this lack of a formal 
fiscal authority, but does not contemplate substantial changes relating to the other 
differences. 
The two key elements of the Economic and Fiscal Union are the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP), which together with the Fiscal Compact should guarantee that member 
states follow countercyclical fiscal policies in normal times by limiting their deficit and 
debt capacity, and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the first important step 
in the roadmap launched in 2012 as a crisis resolution mechanism for member states 
suffering crises threatening the stability of the euro area. 
The SGP is complemented by two surveillance mechanisms under the lead of the 
European Commission. The first is the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP), 
established in 2011. This is aimed at detecting and preventing risks, implicit liabilities 
and macroeconomic imbalances, which can trigger the ‘excessive imbalance procedure’, 
with the European Council requiring a corrective action plan for any country that deviates 
from the MIP recommendations. The second is the European Semester (launched in 
2011), where the European Commission provides periodic feedback and ‘warnings’ to 
EU member states regarding their SGP and other economic policies recommended by 
the Council. If there are persistent ‘excessive economic imbalances’, the semester can 
trigger financial ‘sanctions’ of up to 0.5% of GDP. In addition, following the roadmap, 
the independent advisory European Fiscal Board (EFB) was established in 2015 with 
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the objective of providing external advice and assessments to the Commission regarding 
the evolution of the Economic and Fiscal Union, and cooperating with the national 
Independent Fiscal Councils.5
In sum, the main objective of the Economic and Fiscal Union – namely, economic 
stability – is in the hands of the member states (as stressed in European Commission 
2017d). To confront the underlying time-inconsistency problem (i.e. not following 
proper counter-cyclical fiscal policies) and, in particular, to guarantee that the Stability 
and Growth Pact will be respected, there is an elaborate and detailed apparatus of 
surveillance, advice and possible sanctions. Supposedly, the Fiscal Compact should 
have played an enforcement role by giving the SGP constitutional status, as it has been 
done in a few countries (e.g. Spain) and, supposedly, the SGP should have improved 
since 2015 with its additional flexibility and its capacity to exercise pecuniary sanctions. 
In practice, sanctions – which must be imposed by the Council on one of its members 
– do not take place, and the complex surveillance system does not go much beyond 
providing information and advice, ‘peer pressure’, and a forum for policy coordination. 
All these elements are valuable, but do not amount to a credible mechanism to enforce 
stabilisation policies in the euro area. There are three elements that are worrisome:
• First and foremost, a mechanism to avoid time-inconsistency problems (i.e. not 
doing ex post what was agreed ex ante) typically has rewards and punishments 
(‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’) conditional on observed performance. The current SGP 
mechanism has no ‘carrots’ and cannot credibly use its ‘sticks’.6 
• By mixing the ‘watch-dog’ surveillance with a non-credible sanctioning mechanism, 
there is a danger that the information about countries’ performance gets distorted or, 
even if it does not, that it loses value – in contrast, for example, with the information 
that could be produced by an independent institution (e.g. the EFB) with the same 
professional capacity.
5 See Beetsma and Debrun (2018) for an assessment of existing Independent Fiscal Councils and the role of the EFB.
6 European Commission (2017c) refers to a “European Investment Protection Scheme” and a “European Uneployment 
Reinsurance Scheme”, together with loans from the ESM and grants from the EU budget, as instruments of a future 
‘Stabilisation Function”. More details are needed to assess them, but they seem to be designed to ‘fill in holes’ 
(countercyclically, but in a fairly disperse – although EC-controlled – manner), rather than being a ‘stabilisation carrot’.
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• Conversely, while looking into a broad range of policies and economic indicators 
is good practice for an observatory of the economy, having the more political 
Commission doing it may backfire, since it may be perceived as excessive micro-
advising, and as ‘telling sovereign states what to do’ on a broader set of policies. In 
other words, it can work as long as national governments can use the Commission’s 
warnings as an excuse to apply necessary but unpopular policies (by blaming the 
Commission), but it may backfire otherwise.
Of a very different nature and effectiveness is the other main mechanism of the Economic 
and Fiscal Union, the European Stability Mechanism. While this has ‘carrots’ (financial 
assistance), they can only be used in the case of a severe crisis and under ex ante 
conditionality conditions (typically, agreement to a reform/austerity programme). This 
mechanism has worked and has played a major role in the euro crisis – in particular, 
providing financial assistance to Greece (ongoing), Cyprus, Portugal, Ireland, and 
Spain. For example, the ESM holds more than one third of Greece’s sovereign debt, 
which has been transformed into long-term (over 30 years) debt. In fact, it has provided 
more generous and effective assistance to Greece than the IMF has (Corsetti et al. 
2017). However, given that the ESM effectively now has long-term contracts with these 
countries, there are two aspects in which these contracts could be improved:
• Make the loan contract counter-cyclical. Spain received financial assistance to 
solve its banking crisis (in 2012-2013, it used €41.3 billion out of the €100 billion 
made available). In recent years, the country has been growing relatively fast and 
has started to repay its loan earlier than required, for which it had to ask permission 
(which was conceded) on seven occasions. An optimal long-term contract would 
not have simply conceded, it would have required a higher repayment in those years 
of higher growth. What will happen 30 years from now with the Greek debt?
• Make the conditionality ex post, not ex ante. A counter-cyclical debt contract is a 
stabilisation contract that effectively provides risk sharing, and should not result 
in permanent transfers. Properly designed, this contract dominates the existing 
unconditional long-term contracts, creating incentives for the borrowing country 
to always satisfy its payments and not default. Furthermore, it can also be designed 
to address moral hazard problems (i.e. to provide the right incentives to implement 
needed reforms). These ex post incentives are more effective than the current ex 
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ante conditional programmes, which tend to depress consumption.
In sum, even in its current design and limited scope (i.e. as a crisis resolution 
mechanism), by modifying the terms of its contracts the ESM can be a more effective 
stabilisation mechanism, enhancing its contribution to the Economic and Fiscal Union. 
Of course, it can also do much more…
The Four Presidents’ Report (Van Rompuy 2012) called for “[i]mproving the resilience 
of EMU through the creation of a shock-absorption function at the central level” in 
Stage 3 (post-2014), and the Five Presidents’ Report (Juncker et al. 2015) stressed:
“…all mature Monetary Unions have put in place a common macroeconomic 
stabilization function to better deal with shocks that cannot be managed at the 
national level alone”,   
but added: 
“This would be a natural development for the euro area in the longer term and 
under the conditions explained above, i.e. as the culmination of a process of 
convergence and further pooling of decision-making on national budgets.”
The idea that ‘”the EMU would bring convergence across the euro area countries and, 
in turn, convergence, will make the further development of EMU easier” is an old idea 
going back to original designs of the EMU. However, it is counterfactual; the euro 
crisis, for example, has shown a divided euro area, and ‘mature monetary unions such 
as US have had very limited convergence. Furthermore, convergence is not a necessary 
condition to establish a well-functioning stabilisation mechanism (i.e. risk sharing) that 
does not generate persistent transfers across countries; nor is it necessary that there 
should be “further pooling of decision-making on national budgets”.  More importantly, 
setting these presidents’ preconditions may effectively mean that the ‘shock-absorption 
function’ will be postponed sine die.
In contrast, the proposal to establish a European Stability Fund, presented and 
discussed in Chapter 2 of this eBook is an ambitious proposal based on ‘constrained 
efficient mechanism design’, allowing the Economic and Fiscal Union to satisfy its 
‘economic stability’ function without generating persistent undesired transfers across 
A new fiscal and monetary framework for the EMU? The EU presidents’ roadmap in 2018
Ramon Marimon
113
countries; however, an important step for its development consists simply in extending 
the ESM contracts to risk-sharing contracts in normal times and improving their design 
as mentioned above (i.e. integrating the crisis resolution and risk-sharing functions in 
one fund with better contracts). Like the current ESM, the ESF does not require that 
all euro area countries participate at the outset, and it does not require them to suffer a 
severe crisis in order to participate. 
It should be noted that there is a qualitative difference between managing an ESF contract 
– say, a share of a country’s debt7 – and the current ‘surveillance with sanctions’ SGP 
mechanism. First, the ESF contract itself is a counter-cyclical policy; second, it is in 
the interest of the ESF to properly design the contract and guarantee those conditional 
payments and transfers, which make the contract safe. Again, this is only one step 
ahead of the current ESM practice, and therefore there is no need to postpone it sine die.
As the ESM has been successfully used to confront specific banking crises, the ESF 
could also design contracts for specific markets, such as the labour market. As has been 
discussed in Chapter 3 of this eBook, substantial welfare improvements would be made 
possible by introducing a European Unemployment Insurance System (EUIS), possibly 
starting off with a subset of EU countries who could complement it. The underlying 
contract with a participating country has a simpler ex post conditionality structure (a 
fixed replacement rate applied to every eligible unemployed and fixed labour tax rate), 
but it is highly counter-cyclical, providing risk sharing since the country’s EUIS contract 
should only break even in expected terms. From the perspective of optimal contract 
design there is room for improvement, however in this case a simple modification of the 
existing systems may be easier to get agreement upon, and to implement.
Last year, the European Commission “encourage[d] a discussion on the specific design 
of a ‘stabilisation function’” (European Commission 2017c) and proposed several 
“options”. The ESF proposal outlined above responds to this ‘call for ideas’. More 
details are needed to assess the Commission proposal, but it is worth to, briefly and 
7 As discussed in Chapter 2 of this eBook and in more detail in Abraham et al. (2018), and as is the case right now 
– for example with Greece – the ESF could manage only a fraction of a country’s debt, but taking into account the 
country’s overall indebtedness. Only in cases of extreme over-borrowing will this require debt restructuring as a pre-
entry condition.
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provisionally, compare it with the ESF. The Commission’s “stabilisation function” is 
based on three “options”: a “European Investment Protection Scheme”, a “European 
Unemployment Reinsurance Scheme”, and a “rainy day fund”. In addition, the 
Commission also considers loans from the ESM and grants from the EU budget, with 
“a dedicated vehicle managed by the Commission [bringing] together different sources 
of funding at European level in an efficient way to provide the stabilisation function” 
and “[s]ubject to strict eligibility criteria, the Member State facing a large asymmetric 
shock would automatically be entitled to benefit from the assistance provided through 
the stabilisation function” (European Commission 2017d).
In this eBook we have already discussed a possible European Unemployment Insurance 
System (EUIS) in Chapter 3 and I just mentioned above that its EU fund component 
could be integrated in the ESF. Similarly, in Chapter 2 it has been argued that a ‘rainy 
day fund’ was nothing more than a very restricted version of the proposed ESF.8 To 
foster growth and, in particular, to overcome existing socioeconomic divisions within 
the EU, European strategic investments can be a valid policy (i.e. the already existing 
European Fund for Strategic Investments, or EFSI), but the role of a “European 
Investment Protection Scheme” as a stabilisation policy is less clear. In particular, if the 
funds a country receives to continue its ‘strategic investments’ in times of crisis take 
the form of a loan, the ESF contract should take care of this, and more efficiently than 
with a non-contingent debt contract. Alternatively, if the funds take the form of grants 
or of EU investment transfers, then they should be considered part of other EU policies 
(EFSI, ‘structural funds’, ‘R&D and innovation policy’, etc.). Otherwise, they are likely 
to violate the principle that “the [stabilization] function should not lead to permanent 
transfers” (European Commission 2017c), or the principle that a country should have 
ownership of its own ‘strategic investments’, unless they are joint EU investments. 
The main differences between the two proposals are that (i) the ESF is an integrated 
institutional and contractual proposal which embeds the current ESM, while the 
European Commissions’ ‘stabilisation function’ is separated from the ESM and relies 
on a “dedicated vehicle”, which coordinates the three “options”, provides grants, loans 
8 The Commission only mentions that the “rainy day fund could accumulate funds from Member States on a regular basis 
and disbursements would be triggered on a pre-defined basis” (European Commission 2017d).
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with the support of the ESM, and so on;9 (ii) the ESF does not require EU budget 
funding, while the EC’s grants should come from the EU budget; and (iii) any EU 
country can subscribe an ESF contract (with its corresponding risk assessment), while 
the Commission’s ‘stabilisation function’ has “strict eligibility criteria”.
In summary, in spite of the euro crisis and Brexit – indeed, due in part to these events – 
important steps have been taken “[t]owards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union” 
since Van Rompuy, in collaboration with three other presidents of the EU, traced their 
roadmap for the EMU. Mostly based on the recent experience of the EMU and the 
ADEMU research, I have emphasised: 
• First, the important role that properly addressing credibility problems has in the 
EMU design – this was already true in the establishment of the euro, but it is even 
more true in the overall EMU design, but it was not very explicit in the presidents’ 
roadmap; 
• Second, three aspects concerning the three unions that form EMU: 1) the key role 
of the ECB as the main institution, not only of the Monetary Union but of the 
Economic and Monetary Union; 2) the need to complete the Financial Union, 
basically ‘according to the roadmap’, although with some caveats regarding its 
complexity and incompleteness, and 3) the importance of properly addressing the 
‘economic stability’ function of the Economic and Fiscal Union, and in particular, 
the opportunity to establish, from the current ESM, a second leading institution 
within the EMU for which the ADEMU project has provided a theoretical and 
quantitative foundation, namely, a European Stability Fund. 
Furthermore, the ESF could also act as a fund for other EMU needs and policies. One – 
to be the ‘backstop for the Single Resolution Mechanism’ – is in the roadmap, another 
– to develop a European Unemployment Insurance System - is in the policy debate to 
which ADEMU research has also contributed.
9 The “dedicated vehicle” is even less defined than the ‘unique legal entity’ proposed by the European Commission as the 
legal institutional form of the ESM, transformed into a European Monetary Fund; see Chapter 10 in this eBook for a 
discussion of the latter.
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the Horizon 2020 ADEMU research project (June 2015 – May 2018). 
The main aim of the project was to reassess the fiscal and monetary 
framework of the European Economic Monetary Union (EMU) after 
the euro crisis, when this framework is still in transition and under 
debate. The research has used, and has further developed, the tools 
and theories of modern economics and finance, as well as of modern 
legal research, with three aims: 
• to gain a better understanding on how economies, with 
heterogeneous agents, behave and react to policies in times of crisis 
and recession – with a focus on European economies through the 
euro crisis; 
• in light of this enhanced understanding, to reassess the current EMU 
framework and existing proposals for reform – in particular, the 
Presidents’ Reports and European Commission proposals; and 
• to come up with new proposals to strengthen the resilience and 
competitiveness of the EMU which can be implemented with 
consensus in the current heterogeneous euro area. 
The first aim required covering a large number of related topics, 
including sovereign debt crisis, risk-sharing and economic stabilisation 
policies, fiscal stimulus and consolidation policies, fiscal multipliers, 
optimal tax policies in the global and automated economies, financial 
stability, and macroprudential and unconventional monetary policies. 
The second implied focusing on the financial and economic stability 
of the euro area; in particular, the incomplete Banking Union and the 
not yet fully functioning Economic and Fiscal Union. The third aim 
resulted in two new proposals to strengthen the EMU’s risk-sharing and 
economic stabilisation capacity: the European Stability Fund (ESF) and a 
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